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1 Giants and Midgets: the Effect of
Public Goods’ Provision on Urban
Population Concentration
This paper analyses explains population distribution within a system of cities with avail-
ability of public goods in the country and provides an explanation for the existence of
urban giants in developing economies. The article argues that (1) differences in public
goods’ provision cause excessive growth of the primate cities; (2) better provision of public
goods at the national level decreases the difference between growth rates of the primate
agglomeration and the hinterland; (3) consequently, low provision of public goods at the
national level leads to the emergence of urban giants. Regression analysis suggests that
lower provision of public goods at the national level causes excessive population growth
of the largest city of the country, and a subsequent further growth of urban giants can
potentially attract even more migrants to the primate cities and halt urbanisation process
in the rest of the country. These findings are especially relevant for developing countries,
where rapid urbanisation is currently taking place.
JEL Codes: O1, R12, R53, H41, H71, E20
Keywords: city, public goods, growth, urbanization, primacy
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Introduction
Urbanisation has been ongoing since the very early stages of human development. In the
twentieth century it has reached an extremely high pace. While in 1950 only one third of the
world’s population was living in urban areas, this number increased to half of the mankind
by 2014. By 2050 two thirds of the world’s population are expected to be urbanised (United
Nations, 2015). These figures show how extremely rapid the urbanization process has been
in the past decades and is expected to continue like this. However, countries are currently
at different stages of urbanisation. For example, developed countries are already rather
urbanised. In North America, 82 per cent of the population live in the urban areas and 73
per cent do so in Europe. On the contrary, Asia and Africa are still mostly rural with only
48 and 40 per cent of their population living in the urbanised areas, respectively (United
Nations, 2015). The connection between urbanisation rates and income levels is clear and
not new to the literature. As countries move from agricultural to industrialised economies,
more people move to the cities. However, why do we observe more megacities in developing
countries than in developed ones, as United Nations (2015) indicate? This paper argues
that disproportionate provision of public goods might lead to excessive growth of population
in the largest (primate) cities and impede growth of the remaining urban structure.
Modern theory finds many reasons for cities to emerge. Spatial concentration decreases
transaction costs, provides easier and cheaper access to production infrastructure and gives
enterprises a larger pool of skilful employees (see Duranton and Puga (2004) for a more
detailed overview of urban agglomeration economies). However, large cities are associated
with higher pollution and crime levels simply due to their increased size. Besides that,
higher rents and commuting costs, crowding and decreasing returns to scale might have
negative influence on the economy (Mohring, 1961; Duranton and Turner, 2011; Glaeser,
2014). There exists no universal size or number of citizens that maximize the difference
between agglomeration benefits and drawbacks of the oversized cities. The optimal size is
rather dependent on many factors that can substantially vary between cities (Henderson,
1974; Fujita, 1989; Fujita et al., 1999; Duranton and Puga, 2001; Henderson, 2005; Au
and Henderson, 2006; Glaeser, 2008; Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013). It is obvious
that neither too small, nor too large cities are desired. If a city is undersized, it does not
fully employ urban economies and further population increase can make its residents better
off. The opposite holds for a city that is too big: disadvantages outweigh overall urban
benefits. However, the size of the primate city affects utility in other areas of the country,
too (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Davis and Henderson, 2003; Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg,
2013; Glaeser, 2014). This paper analyses how the degree of population concentration in
the largest city affects population distribution in the whole country. Understanding this
mechanism is important for more efficient and equal economic growth for the residents of
all areas of the country. Countries currently experiencing the urbanisation process can
prevent the emergence of urban giants and attain higher aggregate utility level, if public
resources are distributed equally across locations (Henderson, 2003). Alternatively, over-
proportionate concentration of people in one location can lead to utility dead-weight losses
and substantial share of resources turns out to be wasted.
This article demonstrates how urban giants can distort urbanisation in the whole nation.
First, the paper presents a simple theoretical application that describes the relationship
between public goods and a city size. If a primate city can offer substantially more ameni-
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ties than the rest of the country, it attracts additional migrants from other areas or ensures
relatively higher population growth rate of the local residents. This process diverts poten-
tial migrants to other urban areas and impedes population growth in the hinterland cities,
so we can argue that the excessive growth of primate cities happens at the expense of the
hinterland. Moreover, if we allow for positive correlation between population size and the
amount of public goods in the location (e.g., due to more disposable tax funds), we can
expect a self-inducing growth of the primate agglomeration. This process might lead to
the emergence of urban giants that co-exist with immensely small towns in the same coun-
try. Such an unbalanced distribution of population across locations can entail dead-weight
utility losses for the whole nation: congestion in the primate city (e.g., higher rents, crime,
etc.) harms potentially higher utility from increased productivity and additional public
goods, while the lack of residents in smaller towns constrains productivity spillovers and
infrastructure development. This theoretical argument is supported by empirical evidence
obtained using estimates from a panel of 88 countries followed for 25 years (1990-2014).
To obtain robust results in the presence of endogeneity I employ Fixed Effects and 2SLS
estimators. Empirical findings support the predictions of the theoretical application: lower
provision of public goods in the country is positively associated with an excessive popula-
tion growth of the primate cities making them grow faster than the rest of the country and
turning them into urban giants.
Given that cities foster individual productivity, we can expect urbanisation to be positively
associated with economic development. Income rises when countries move from agriculture
to industrial production and this process requires concentration of workers in the cities
(Harris and Todaro, 1970; Caselli, 2005; Caselli and Feyrer, 2007; Lagakos and Waugh,
2013; Glaeser, 2014; Gollin et al., 2016). On the other hand, spatial concentration of
workers fosters innovations and, hence, further productivity growth (Duranton and Puga,
2001; Henderson, 2010; Michaels et al., 2012; Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014). As a
result, we can expect a self-fueling process of urbanisation-induced growth. However, this
appears not necessarily true for large, but poor cities in developing countries (Fay and
Opal, 2000; Jedwab and Vollrath, 2015, 2018; Glaeser and Henderson, 2017; Chauvin et al.,
2017). Despite the lower overall urbanisation rates, the world’s largest cities are located in
developing countries. Only four out of twenty biggest cities are located in the developed
economies (Jedwab and Vollrath, 2018). A range of studies provides different explanations
for the emergence of urban giants with a particular focus on developing countries: e.g.,
Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Davis and Henderson (2003) highlight the importance of
political factors; Gustavsson (1999) provides evidence for trade barriers increasing the
concentration in the third-world urban centres; Jedwab and Vollrath (2015) and Jedwab
et al. (2017) demonstrate that the demographic transition is largely responsible for the
population growth of urban giants; finally, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) show that
higher efficiency and better amenities lead to larger cities. This paper emphasises the
importance of public amenities’ distribution across the whole country for the emergence of
large cities in developing countries.
Leaving aside the differences between rural and urban income, population distribution
across the existing urban areas might have a significant effect on the economy. Every coun-
try has its primate city, but degrees of spatial concentration can vary substantially. First,
urban concentration has a positive effect on individual productivity for the whole nation,
but after a certain point further concentration of workers in one city can harm the economy
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due to inefficient allocation of resources (Williamson, 1965; Henderson, 2003; Bruelhart and
Sbergami, 2009; Castells-Quintana and Royuela, 2014). Knowing the effect of urban con-
centration on growth, it is important to explain which factors determine the degree of
spatial concentration. Besides productivity increase, city sizes can be affected by other
factors: political reasons (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Davis and Henderson, 2003; Henderson
and Wang, 2007; Chen et al., 2017), better access to trade infrastructure (Glaeser, 2014;
Henderson et al., 2018), natural disasters (Ager et al., 2015; Kocornik-Mina et al., 2015)
and climate (Barrios et al., 2006; Henderson et al., 2017). This paper contributes to the
literature emphasising the importance of local amenities for locational choices (Knapp and
Gravest, 1989; Brueckner et al., 1999; Chen and Rosenthal, 2008; Lall et al., 2009; Albouy,
2016; Castells-Quintana, 2017) by drawing particular attention to water and sanitation
facilities. This paper considers the access of population to improved water and sanitation
facilities due to the number of reasons. First of all, water and sanitation are crucial for
human well-being. Secondly, concentrating on the access instead of actual consumption,
we can assume these amenities to be as close to the theoretical definition of public goods,
as possible. Finally, it is possible to obtain data for a wide pool of countries. The choice
of water and sanitation as proxies for public goods will be explained more thoroughly in
Section 2.
The research topic appears to be practically important for economic growth, especially in
the case of developing countries. Typically, countries at lower stages of economic devel-
opment are more likely to have relatively smaller urban population due to concentration
of workers in agriculture. Nevertheless, the ongoing industrialisation brings more people
to the cities as a result of further economic development. In this case, governments can
lack funds (or cut them down intentionally) to shape urbanisation optimally (Ades and
Glaeser, 1995; Au and Henderson, 2006; Henderson and Wang, 2007). However, such an
interference might be rather harmful for the country as a whole. Despite higher utility from
better public goods in the primate city, congestion also rises, while the rest of the country
can face decline in population and subsequent decrease in public funds. It is important to
understand that improving public infrastructure in the largest city of the economy can be a
very cost-efficient intervention in the short term: providing amenities that improve utility
of a large number of people. However, in a longer perspective subsequent excessive popu-
lation growth increases congestion in the primate city and constrains the development of
the hinterland lowering utility in both locations. As a result, the beneficial effect of public
amenities improvement in the capital might be substantially decreased or even outweighed
by congestion associated with excessive population, while the rest of the country has not
benefited from it at all. An alternative way to distribute funds is to spread investments
equally across locations. This might significantly improve the aggregate well-being and
provide basis for more equal and sustainable growth.
This paper is organised as follows. After the introduction I describe the theoretical ap-
plication that links population size and public goods in different locations of the country,
present how I measure public goods and excessive population, and, finally explain the
empirical methodology. The third section presents the regression results. The conclusion
section summarises the findings of the paper.
4
1.1 Empirical strategy
1.1 Empirical strategy
1.1.1 Theoretical application
In this section I present a simple theoretical application to demonstrate the connection
between the relative population size of a city1, public goods provision and migration. The
main aim is not to derive particular optimal conditions, but rather illustrate the complex
relationship between the accessibility of basic amenities provided in the urban agglomer-
ation and the number of citizens to put some structure and motivate the empirical part.
For this reason I employ the theoretical framework from Galiani and Kim (2011).
The model considers two regions: the mainland (i.e., the primate city) and the hinterland.
In both locations individuals provide one unit of labour for production of homogeneous
output according to the following function:
Xi = AiL
α
i G
1−α
i , α ∈ (0, 1), (1.1)
where Ai is the local productivity parameter, Li is the population and Gi is the amount of
public goods in a location i. Given only two regions in the model i takes values of C for
the primate city and H for the hinterland. Having prices of output normalised to 1, the
profit maximisation problem will yield the real wage wi:
wi = αAi
(
Gi
Li
)1−α
. (1.2)
The real wage rate in Eq.(1.2) is decreasing in population, reflecting congestion effects
(Mohring, 1961; Troesken, 2004; Henderson, 2005; Duranton and Turner, 2011; Desmet
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013). However, larger areas can still be attractive for the residents
due to higher productivity or the larger variety of public goods provided there. Assuming
unconstrained migration between the locations, we can expect the real wages to equalise
in both locations:
wC(AC , LC , GC) = wH(AH , LH , GH).
Employing Eq.(1.2) we can derive the relative size of the primate city C as a function of
public goods and productivity in both locations:
LC
LH
=
GC
GH
(
AC
AH
) 1
1−α
. (1.3)
Unlike Galiani and Kim (2011) I deliberately do not model public goods endogenously to
1It is necessary to define the term “city” as it is used in this paper. Modern literature usually refers
to “metro areas” consisting of many municipalities. By defining metro areas we can cover the “entire
labour market of the area, service and residential activities radiating from the core city, until activity
peters out into farm land or very low density development” (Henderson, 2005, p.1548). Employing the
metro area definition, rather than the formal bureaucratic interpretation, we concentrate on functions
that a city fulfils. However, sometimes, especially in the case of highly urbanised countries, metro areas
can grow extremely big and even absorb areas that are specialised on non-urban economic activities
(agriculture) or satellite cities. The intermediate solution would be the concept of urban areas that
have a common infrastructure system, but do not contain the rural land and close-located settlements.
Further in this paper when I refer to a “city” one should generally consider the “urban area”.
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avoid any assumptions about the determinants of their distribution. In my interpretation
of Eq.(1.3) provision of particular public amenities is a result of a complicated political
process that I take as exogenously given2. In other words, I do not aim to explain why
public goods are distributed this way, but analyse how this allocation affects population
distribution. Moreover, modelling public goods as a function of the population size, as it
was done by Galiani and Kim (2011), is not necessarily appropriate for the cases of access
to water and sanitation that are considered in the current article. As we consider the share
of population having access to a particular amenity, the effect of population is dual: on the
one hand, more people can provide more funds for construction of required infrastructure,
on the other, higher congestion levels constrain access to the existing infrastructure3.
The main purpose of the theoretical part and the paper as a whole is to demonstrate that
the level of public goods’ provision at the national level negatively affects the relative size
of the primate city. For empirical testing of this relationship I consider LC as a number
of residents in the largest city of the economy, and LH is the population in other urban
agglomerations. As Eq.(1.3) demonstrates, the relative size of the primate city is expected
to be negatively affected by the amount of public goods in the hinterland.
In other words, a decrease in GH has to be accompanied by the growth of the relative size
of the primate city. There are two reasons for this. First of all, amenity-seeking agents
can migrate to the largest city, where public goods are expected to be better provided
(as will be demonstrated later). Second, lower level of public goods provision can entail
higher mortality or lower fertility rates in the hinterland. This relationship holds even
if GC and GH are completely independent from each other. If we allow for negative
correlation between the two characters (e.g., public amenities in both regions are funded
from one limited source), this effect will be only amplified. Besides public goods, population
distribution is expected to be affected by local productivity parameters. Unfortunately,
there exist no data of this type. However, I assume that productivity ratio does not change
over 25 years considered in the study and can be controlled for by inclusion of country
fixed effects.
1.1.2 Measuring public goods
This paper does not rule out the possibility that other factors, like productivity differences,
affect migration, but focuses on the effect of particular amenities. Clearly, we cannot mea-
sure all public goods provided in a city. For this reason I need to find a set of proxies
for local amenities or concentrate on those public goods that are utmost important for
individuals. In this paper I choose shares of national population with access to improved
water source and sanitation as the variables indicating public goods provision. First of
all, these amenities are simply important for survival and further economic development
(Cain and Rotella, 2001; Troesken, 2004; Costa and Kahn, 2006; Ashraf et al., 2016; Beach
et al., 2016), so they might have more significant effect on migration decisions than, for
example, reputation of the local opera theatre. If we refer to the Maslow’s hierarchy of
2Existing studies typically explain provision of public goods by political favouritism (Ades and Glaeser,
1995; Henderson and Wang, 2007; Chen et al., 2017). However, applying similar patterns for cross-
country analysis might be misleading, and does not add predicting power for the purposes of the model.
3Finally, possible reverse causality will be controlled for using instrumental variables strategy described
later.
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needs (Maslow, 1943), water and sanitation serve the “physiological” needs category, hence,
typically individuals will first aim to fulfil these necessities. Public goods like healthcare
or education correspond to “higher” levels of the hierarchy (the safety needs for healthcare
and the esteem or self-actualisation for education). Inclusion of public goods fulfilling the
needs of higher orders can help to explain migration decisions even better, especially in the
countries at later stages of development. However, having developing countries in the cen-
tre of this research, “physiological” needs can still be a good predictor of amenity-seeking
migration. Secondly, access to water and sanitation is, probably, the closest example to
the formal definition of public goods (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Given that the variables
measure access and not actual consumption, we can, at least, assume some effects of their
availability to be non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Even if an individual has no access
to water or sanitation himself (or has to compete for it), the use of these facilities by the
neighbours increases his utility through cleaner neighbourhood and better disease environ-
ment. Finally, data are available for a wide range of countries. In other words, I have the
data for GH from Eq.(1.3) for a large number countries and years and can investigate how
these values affect population distribution.
It is important to note that access to improved water and sanitation facilities is quite likely
to be a good proxy for other amenities, especially at the early stages of development. The
two variables are highly correlated with each other and can be very well predicted by public
per-capita expenditures, as will be demonstrated later. Given this, we can expect that if
water and sanitation are well-provided, other public goods might be, too. The Demographic
and Health Surveys Program (DHS) provides data on access to a set of amenities that to
some degree can be considered public goods. Variables like share of population living in
households with an improved water source or improved, non-shared toilet facilities can be
considered rather infrastructural amenities. Net primary and secondary school attendance
rate serve as proxies for education. Even though schooling can be commonly paid privately
in some countries, public expenditures are still considered extremely important for efficient
functioning of educational systems, especially in developing countries (UNESCO, 2015).
The same holds for healthcare: without public spending developing countries cannot achieve
universal access to this type of facilities (World Health Organisation, 2010). Health-related
public goods are proxied by the shares of women that received antenatal care from a skilled
provider and had assistance during delivery from a skilled provider. Table 1.1 demonstrates
that correlation coefficients between the six variables are quite high. In other words, values
of access to water and sanitation can be also considered as an indication of general level of
public goods provision in the country.
It is important to clarify whether residents of big cities have better access to public goods.
Unfortunately, data on public goods provision in particular cities are scarce. The World
Bank data suggest that developed countries have close-to-universal access to water and
sanitation at the national level, but we know little about the distribution of these amenities
in the countries where provision is substantially below 100%. However, Urban Data from
UN-Habitat programme and the DHS Program provide figures on shares of population in
a particular location with access to some basic amenities available in different regions of
the country. In Table 1.2 I compare provision of public goods in primate cities and other
regions of the countries. As the results of a paired t-test of means suggest, in a given
sample all of the mentioned proxies for public amenities are on average better provided in
the largest cities compared to the rest of the country.
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Table 1.1: Correlation coefficients between water, sanitation and other public goods
Infrastructure Education Healthcare
water toilet primary secondary prenatal birth attended
water 1.0000
(9941)
toilet 0.4082 1.0000
(8661) (8837)
primary 0.4777 0.2197 1.0000
(5317) (5301) (5493)
secondary 0.6145 0.5749 0.4919 1.0000
(5317) (5301) (5493) (5493)
prenatal 0.4032 0.1166 0.4598 0.2779 1.0000
(9475) (8533) (5473) (5473) (9651)
birth attended 0.6266 0.4202 0.5221 0.6684 0.6512 1.0000
(8936) (7870) (5424) (5424) (8986) (9112)
Number of observations is in parentheses. Data are at the level of within-country regions. All
correlations are statistically significant at 1%-level. The list of countries is included in the Appendix.
All data used are from the DHS Program.
Table 1.2: Access to public goods in the primate cities and other regions of the country
mean level of access in:
Public good primate city other regions difference N of obs.(countries)
Panel A: Data from UN-Habitat programme
Improved water 90.527 85.827a -4.7∗∗∗ 49(48)
Improved sanitation 78.420 66.835a -11.586∗∗∗ 49(48)
Panel B: Data from the DHS Program
Improved water 90.453 70.941 -19.512∗∗∗ 136(56)
Improved non-shared toilet 37.678 27.616 -10.062∗∗∗ 122(56)
Primary education 79.884 71.232 -8.652∗∗∗ 69(43)
Secondary education 50.967 38.272 -12.694∗∗∗ 69(43)
Prenatal care 92.143 83.657 -8.486∗∗∗ 137(57)
Birth attended 83.752 60.363 -23.389∗∗∗ 127(55)
“Other regions” category is defined as “ ‘other cities/towns” in the UN-Habitat data, and "Total" in
the DHS data. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This stylised fact supports the following assumption: when public goods are not universally
provided, their level of provision is typically higher in the biggest urban agglomeration of
the country. Even if lower level of public amenities provision nationally can be explained
by lower urbanisation rate, the disparity between the primate and other cities cannot be
explained by this factor.
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Figure 1.1: Provision of public goods in primate city and hinterland
Note: X-axis: total level of provision of a respective public good; Y-axis: difference between the level of
provision in the primate city and the total level. Red lines show linearly fitted values. Sources: the DHS
Program and author’s calculations.
Finally, I can demonstrate how the provision of public goods nationwide correlates with
the difference between the level of provision in the primate city and the total country level.
Figure 1 demonstrates that as countries move towards universal provision of public goods,
the disparity between the primate city and the hinterland shrinks. This finding supports
the hypothesis that in countries with less developed infrastructure incentives to migrate to
the primate city can be higher compared to relatively more developed economies, as the
utility gain associated with migration is expected to be high.
1.1.3 Measuring excessive population
Similar to the data on public goods distribution, large-scale information on migration or
region-specific mortality and fertility is rarely available. For this reason I construct “syn-
thetic” populations of the primate cities. Population size data are available for the whole
nation, total urban areas and the primate cities for a wide range of countries. Subtracting
the size of the primate city from the overall urban population yields the size of all urban
agglomerations except for the largest one. Then, we can calculate the annual growth rate
of this estimated variable to see how an average (non-primate) city in the country was
evolving over time. Afterwards, I take 1990 as the initial period (t = 0 in terms of the
model) and apply the calculated growth rate year by year to the size of the primate city.
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Hence, we can evaluate how the primate city would have grown, if it was just an average
city4. Next, I subtract the simulated size of the primate city from its real size to obtain
the “excessive population” of the largest urban area. Finally, to use this number for anal-
ysis, one needs to scale it. Larger countries simply have more citizens that can potentially
migrate compared to the small ones. To control for this scale difference of various coun-
tries I divide the calculated “excessive population” (µˆB,it) by the actual size of the national
population (Nit):
mit =
µˆB,it
Nit.
(1.4)
As a result, mit indicates the share of national population of country i that turned out
in the primate city in year t, additionally to the amount that is expected to emerge in
an average urban area given a set of country characteristics (e.g., urbanisation rate, level
of economic development, etc.). Of course, public goods can contribute to higher growth
rates in the largest agglomerations not only with migration, but also with better survival
rates (e.g., due to better disease environment). However, this does not undermine the
explanatory power of mit. Moreover, it amplifies the migration argument: it is natural to
believe that people try to migrate to areas where they or their future offspring has better
chances of survival. In other words, we can consider mit as the share of total national
population that migrated, was successfully born or avoided death in the primate city due
to better provision of public goods there.
1.1.4 Empirical methodology
The theoretical application presented above predicts that primate cities can attract more
migrants and ensure higher population growth rate than other locations in the country,
especially if we consider developing states with low national level of provision of public
goods. At the same time, an increase in the size of the primate urban agglomeration allows
provision of more public goods and can intensify further population growth. Moreover,
when citizens abandon a location of origin, it might reduce disposable funds of the local
government (for example, cut in central government subsidies), so provision of public goods
in this hinterland region decreases. As a result, we can see a self-fuelling migration pro-
cess that can lead to the emergence of urban giants and depopulation or slower growth
of hinterland areas. The empirical section of this paper suggests that: (1) provision of
public goods at the national level is significantly negatively associated with the excessive
population share in the largest city in the economy; (2) population concentration in the
largest city is positively and significantly correlated with excessive population share; (3)
excessive population increases the size of the primate city (both absolute and relative).
The baseline regression specification is as follows:
mit = β0 + β1θ¯it + β2Ωit + λt + ui + εit, (1.5)
where θ¯it is the national level of public goods provision, λt and ui are year and country
fixed effects, respectively and εit is a residual term. It is important to note that mit is
4This is especially important for developing countries, where urbanisation actively takes place. Alterna-
tively, one could have applied the national population growth rate. However, this would not take into
account migration from rural areas that naturally happens at this stage of economic development.
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calculated using the difference between the values of population sizes in periods t and t+1.
In other words, it indicates the excessive population share that emerged in the primate city
during the period t. That is why I add controls for the period t.
Ωit is a set of time-varying country characteristics that might affect migration. First of all,
I need to control for the size of the primate city. As the evidence above suggests, bigger
cities can provide more public goods, hence, are more attractive for migrants compared to
smaller locations. I can control for the actual size of the primate city, but if other cities in
the country are only marginally smaller this approach might be not very useful. Moreover,
the city size per se might be misleading, if we do cross-country comparisons. New York
agglomeration has a population above 20 million people making it one of the largest cities
in the world. However, the US is a highly urbanised country and the existence of other large
agglomerations, like Los Angeles (15.1 mil.) or Chicago (9.1 mil.) (Demographia, 2016)
makes New York much less of a giant, with only of 6% of the total U.S. population residing
in the city. On the contrary, Luanda had around 7 million inhabitants in 2016 according to
Demographia (2016). Nevertheless, more than 20% of the total population was residing in
Angola’s capital. To compare how much a particular primate city dominates other areas,
it makes sense to normalise its size by the total population of a country. In other words,
employing relative size of the biggest cities allows more accurate comparisons between the
countries at different stages of economic development.
Other controls included in Ω are national population size, absolute size of the primate
agglomeration, speed of urbanisation, population density and log of per capita GDP. mit
already accounts for the fact that larger populations can provide more migrants. However,
population size can still affect migration through other ways: the more people reside in
the country, the more likely is the existence of other large agglomerations, that might be
worth migrating to. Absolute size of the largest urban agglomeration is added to control if
migrants are attracted by the absolute size of the primate city instead of the relative one.
Furthermore, if we consider urbanisation as a process of migration from rural to urban
areas, intensiveness of this process might affect excessive migration to the primate city. To
control for this effect I include speed of urbanisation (growth rate of the share of population
living in urban areas) into the regression. Another control variable is population density,
that shows how many people on average reside per 1 squared kilometre. Higher density
might ease migration to the primate city, as potential migrants might face lower relocation
costs due to shorter distances they have to cover. Finally, I include natural logarithm of per
capita GDP into the regression analysis. If individuals lack some public goods, in locations
where they currently reside, higher income might allow them to get it privately instead of
undertaking the move to the primate city or dying without it.
It is important to consider that access to water and sanitation, even measured at the coun-
try level, can be affected by population concentration in the largest city. If citizens are
concentrated in one city, it might be easier to provide them with water and sanitation,
as the local government has to only expand existing infrastructure rather than build if
from scratch. According to this argument, share of total population living in the primate
city can be positively associated with public goods provision at the national level. On the
other hand, if population is concentrated in the largest city, hinterland areas might lack
funds to develop necessary infrastructure. Following this logic, we can expect population
concentration to be negatively associated with the share of population that has access to
water and sanitation. Overall, the share of population living in the primate city can affect
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the water and sanitation access variables, raising problem of multicollinearity. However, as
Table A1.2 demonstrates, the correlation coefficient between the share of national popula-
tion living in the largest city and water and sanitation is 0.39 and 0.46, respectively, way
below the rule of thumb level of 0.8 suggested by Gujarati (2003, p. 359).
Furthermore, I must ensure that provision of public goods is not affected by the share
of excessive population in the primate city. An increase in the city size can provide the
local governments with more funds for the provision of public goods. Again, this improves
access to water and sanitation in the primate city, but decreases it in the hinterland, so
the effect on the national level of provision is unambiguous. Nevertheless, this indicates
an endogeneity problem that can bias the estimated coefficients. For this reason I em-
ploy an instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy. I choose per capita governmental
expenditures as an instrument for the share of population with access to water and sani-
tation at the national level. I assume public expenditures at the country level to be not
determined by water and sanitation provision, i.e. the causality runs only one way. The
potential effect of these particular public amenities is indirect and is likely to be diluted
by more powerful determinants, such as GDP per capita or institutional quality. Further-
more, average public expenditures at the national level can be assumed to be not driven by
population concentration or migration flows. Even if capitals get disproportionately more
funds per one citizen at the expense of hinterland areas, this will not affect the mean level
of governmental expenditures.
After demonstrating how public goods and population concentration in the largest city
affect excessive population growth of the primate urban agglomeration, I can analyse the
effect of mit on the size of the largest city in the country. In other words I try to analyse
if this additional source of population in the primate city is substantial for an already big
urban agglomeration. For this I will estimate the following regression equation:
primate city sizeit = α0 + α1mit + α2Ωit + κt + vi + ηit, (1.6)
where Ωit is the same set of controls, as in Eq.(1.5), but extended by the share of population
living in urban areas, κt and vi are time and country fixed effects, respectively, ηit is a
residual term.
It is important to note that population concentration is not the same as the actual size of
the largest city. Large primate agglomeration does not universally imply that the major
share of population resides there. Moreover, Table A1.2 shows that the absolute size of
the primate city and the share of national population living in it are rather independent
from each other with the coefficient of correlation close to -0.01, not significant at 10-%
level. As the estimation results in the next section suggest, excessive population share in
the primate city is determined by its relative and not absolute size, if we control for other
driving factors. As a result, I conclude that I found no significant evidence of the presence
of reverse causality between excessive population share in the primate city and its absolute
size.
All data used are from the The World Bank (2018b). I limit the sample to only complete
observations over the period between 1991 and 2014, so that the panel is strongly balanced.
The 88 countries that are included in the analysis are listed in the Appendix. In 2014 the
total number of people living in the countries included into the sample was 6315 million
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people (87% of the world’s population, according to (The World Bank, 2018b)). A brief
overview of the analysed variables is presented in Table A1.1. Due to the fact that wa-
ter and sanitation provision are highly correlated with each other (correlation coefficient
0.88, statistically significant at 1-% level), including them into one regression will induce
multicollinearity. For this reason I run separated regressions for water and sanitation. As
will be seen later, choice of a proxy for public goods provision does not change the general
intuition.
1.2 Estimation results
1.2.1 Public goods provision and excessive population
First of all, I need to demonstrate that the level of public goods provision has significant
effect on excessive population share in the largest urban agglomeration in the economy.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show that access to improved sanitation and water facilities have sig-
nificant negative effect on excessive population in the primate city. This finding supports
the hypothesis that the higher is the aggregate level of public goods provision, the more
likely the citizens to find them in the location they currently live in. As a result, availabil-
ity of public goods reduces incentives to migrate to the largest city for the representative
individual living outside the primate city and decreases mortality in the hinterland. If
we compare the coefficients for sanitation and water access, we can notice that the former
variable has a bigger effect, both in terms of magnitude and significance. An increase in the
share of aggregate population with access to improved sanitation facilities by one standard
deviation on average results into a decrease of excessive population share by one standard
deviation. At the same time, improving access to water by one standard deviation decreases
excessive population share by only one third of a standard deviation. This finding can be
explained the following way. Firstly, on average access to water is substantially better pro-
vided in the sample than to sanitation, as Table A1.1 indicates. Moreover, a paired t-Test
of the equality of means yields a p-value of 0.000, indicating that the difference between
the two variables is highly significant. Given this, excessive population is expected to be
less sensitive to the access to a water source, as generally chances to get it are quite high
throughout the whole country (hence, lower migration incentives) and the average level is
enough to survive even in the hinterland. On the contrary, improved sanitation facilities
are comparatively rare, so migrating to the primate city, where public infrastructure is
expected to be better developed, can bring high utility gains and provide way healthier
disease environment. These results are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of additional
controls, as Tables 1.3 and 1.4 demonstrate.
Another important question that needs to be tested: does an increased size of a city allows
provision of more public goods? Consequently, we can expect that an increased concen-
tration of national population in the largest urban agglomeration intensifies the migration
process to this city and increases natural population growth rate. The share of national
population residing in the primate city has significantly positive effect on excessive pop-
ulation variable. The size of the coefficient does not vary much between Tables 1.3 and
1.4. More importantly, the magnitude of this effect is very strong: one standard deviation
increase in national population concentration in the primate city translates into 2.7 stan-
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dard deviations stronger excessive migration inflow. The absolute size of the primate city
is positively associated with excessive population, but this variable loses its significance, if
we add other controls. Overall, the estimation results suggest that the bigger the primate
city compared to other locations in the country, the more public goods can be expected
there, so we can expect the self-fuelling growth process to take place. This can be a sign
of a reverse causality problem, that will be controlled for by the IV estimation later in the
paper.
Table 1.3: Sanitation provision and excessive population.
Depedent variable: mit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sanitation -0.100∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.040) (0.043) (0.050) (0.044)
share of pop. in primate 1.057∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.161) (0.159) (0.164) (0.168) (0.176)
nat. population 0.017∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.006) (0.006)
population density 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
speed of urbanisation 0.251 0.204
(0.197) (0.194)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.603∗ 0.448
(0.326) (0.363)
abs. size of primate 0.387∗∗ 0.225
(0.155) (0.215)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2112 2112 2024 2112 2112 2024
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R-squared 0.384 0.408 0.393 0.390 0.413 0.424
within R-squared 0.391 0.416 0.400 0.398 0.420 0.433
Fixed effects regressions. All regressions include a constant term. Data are from The World Bank
(2018b). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Summing up the results of the first set of regressions (described by Eq. (1.5)), I can
conclude that increased provision of public goods at the national level has a significant
negative correlation on excessive population share in the primate urban agglomeration.
The results support the hypothesis that availability of access to improved sanitation and
water source decreases incentives to migrate to the largest city and provide conditions for a
higher population growth in the hinterland areas. Furthermore, relative size of the primate
city has significant positive effect on excessive population share. This finding supports
the hypothesis that increased concentration of citizens in the largest urban agglomeration
intensifies further excessive population growth and can lead to a slower growth or decrease
in sizes (both absolute and relative) of other locations in the country.
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Table 1.4: Water access and excessive population.
Depedent variable: mit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
water -0.057∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.057∗ -0.060∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.070∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
share of pop. in primate 1.053∗∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.179) (0.165) (0.178) (0.188) (0.191)
nat. population 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.004) (0.007)
population density 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
speed of urbanisation 0.326 0.324
(0.198) (0.199)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.499 0.482
(0.314) (0.365)
abs. size of primate 0.232∗ 0.026
(0.128) (0.199)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2112 2112 2024 2112 2112 2024
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R-squared 0.362 0.377 0.378 0.366 0.373 0.397
within R-squared 0.369 0.385 0.385 0.374 0.381 0.406
Fixed effects regressions. All regressions include a constant term. Data are from The World Bank
(2018b). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
1.2.2 Excessive population and size of primate city
After demonstrating that increased population concentration is positively correlated with
excessive population share in the primate city, I can show what effect migrants have on
city sizes. It is straightforward that higher immigration to the city, higher birth and lower
mortality rates are positively associated with its size. However, the effect of excessive pop-
ulation on the city size is not necessarily strong and significant by construction. Moreover,
if the country in general shows a high population growth rate or urbanisation is currently
actively taking place, excessive population share may play a very little or absolutely no
role in explaining the primate city size. For this reason I run a set of regressions that
demonstrate the significance of migration as a determinant of primate city sizes. First, I
present the result of the estimation of Eq.(1.6) with the absolute size of the primate city
as a dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 1.5.
Coefficients for the excessive population share in Table 1.5 indicate a positive and significant
correlation between the variable and the absolute size of the primate urban agglomeration.
The effect is quantitatively strong, as one standard deviation increase in excessive popula-
tion share on average increases the population of the primate city by 300.000 inhabitants.
Furthermore, this correlation is robust to the inclusion of additional controls, especially the
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Table 1.5: Excessive population and absolute primate city size.
Depedent variable: absolute size of primate city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mit 0.122∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.031) (0.037) (0.046) (0.037) (0.031)
nat. population 0.039∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009)
population density 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
speed of urbanisation 0.047 0.065
(0.056) (0.042)
% of pop. in urban 0.164∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.033)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.755 0.122
(0.498) (0.187)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R-squared 0.388 0.693 0.388 0.486 0.413 0.740
within R-squared 0.395 0.696 0.395 0.492 0.420 0.744
Fixed effects regressions. All regressions include a constant term. Data are from The World Bank
(2018b). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
size and share of national population living in urban areas. Obviously, small countries can
simply lack people to inhabit large cities, so we can expect large urban agglomerations to
be located in bigger countries. The same holds for urbanisation rate: if a country is mostly
rural, people have not yet migrated to the cities (including the primate one). Nevertheless,
inclusion of these two variables into the regression does not decrease the magnitude of the
migration coefficient and still keeps it significant.
However, significance of the coefficients for national population and urbanisation rate in
Table 1.5 suggest that comparing absolute sizes of the primate cities might be misleading,
especially in the case of countries, where urbanisation process is actively ongoing, as was
mentioned before. Furthermore, if public goods in a primate city are provided at the ex-
pense of hinterland areas, excessive population growth it the primate city might constraint
the growth of other locations. To analyse the effect of excessive population share in the
largest urban agglomeration on the urbanisation process in the whole country I can scale
the size of the primate agglomeration by the size of other urban areas. For this purpose I
use the urban primacy variable: the share of total urban population living in the largest
city5. To see the effect of excessive population in the primate city on the relative size of the
5Henderson (2003) mentions two alternative concentration indicators: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and
Pareto parameter. However, urban primacy is highly correlated with these measures and does not
require as much data for calculation as the two other indicators, what allows to carry out the analysis
for a larger set of country-years. See Rosen and Resnick (1980), Gabaix (1999) and Henderson (2003)
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largest urban agglomeration I run the same regression specification as described in Eq.(1.6)
using urban primacy as a dependent variable. The estimation results are presented in Table
1.6.
Table 1.6: Excessive population and relative primate city size.
Depedent variable: urban primacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mit 0.941∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.071) (0.073) (0.077) (0.070)
nat. population -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
population density -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
speed of urbanisation 0.247∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.109) (0.102)
% of pop. in urban -0.007 -0.003
(0.033) (0.030)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.111 0.114
(0.124) (0.120)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R-squared 0.845 0.847 0.853 0.845 0.846 0.854
within R-squared 0.847 0.848 0.855 0.847 0.847 0.856
Fixed effects regressions. All regressions include a constant term. Data are from The World Bank
(2018b). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
As was expected, employing relative size of the largest urban agglomeration allows more
accurate comparison of countries with diverse sizes and at different stages of urbanisation
process. Urban primacy is not driven by the size of national population or urbanisation
rate, as the respective regression coefficients in Table 1.6 suggest. Nevertheless, we see
positive and significant correlation between excessive population share in the largest city
and urban primacy. It is important to note that the significance of the excessive population
coefficient does not necessarily follow from the construction of the mit variable. The exces-
sive population in the largest city, µˆit, in Eq.(1.4) is calculated as the difference between
the actual size of the primate agglomeration and the one simulated using the growth rate
of other urban agglomerations. Hence, if the primate city grows relatively faster than other
urban areas in the country, it increases both mit and primacy. However, this effect can
be quantitatively and statistically insignificant, if an increase in absolute size of the pri-
mate city is very small compared to an absolute increase of all other urban areas. Instead,
we see a statistically significant relationship that is quantitatively strong: a one standard
deviation increase in mit on average increases urban primacy by 3 percentage points.
for a more detailed overview of these measures.
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However, urban primacy per se might be not so harmful. Do we really have to care about
it? Henderson (2003) has demonstrated that after a certain point a further increase in
urban primacy can be harmful for economic growth. Moreover, the theoretical applica-
tion presented in this paper suggests that a bigger largest city, ceteris paribus, decreases
population in the hinterland. The reasons for it are numerous. First of all, better public
goods in the primate urban agglomeration attract migrants from the rest of the country,
both from rural areas and hinterland cities. Moreover, if we allow for positive relationship
between the size of the region (in this example the hinterland) and the amount of public
goods there, outgoing migration from the hinterland might reduce local budgets and, hence,
increase mortality and lower fertility. That is why I also estimate the regressions described
by the Eq.(1.6) with a share of total national population living in all urban areas, except
the primate one. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 1.7
Table 1.7: Excessive population and hinterland city size.
Depedent variable: share of national population in other urban areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mit -0.810∗∗∗ -0.825∗∗∗ -0.805∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗ -0.829∗∗∗ -0.466∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067) (0.071) (0.052) (0.069) (0.046)
nat. population 0.031 0.011∗
(0.025) (0.007)
population density -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
speed of urbanisation -0.095 0.072
(0.142) (0.111)
% of pop. in urban 0.744∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.036)
ln(GDP per capita) 1.390 0.296∗
(0.874) (0.153)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112 2112
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R-squared 0.695 0.722 0.695 0.966 0.707 0.971
within R-squared 0.699 0.725 0.699 0.966 0.710 0.971
Fixed effects regressions. All regressions include a constant term. Data are from The World Bank (2018b).
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.7 demonstrates that excessive population in the primate urban agglomeration de-
creases the size of other urban agglomerations in the country. In other words, I can argue
that excessive growth of the largest city in the economy happens at the expense of other
urban areas. As can be expected, the magnitude of this effect drops after adding urbanisa-
tion rate, but still remains significant. This size of the effect is not to be underestimated:
if excessive population in the primate city increases by one standard deviation, the share
of population in hinterland areas decreases by almost 2 percent.
Summing this subsection up, I can conclude that excessive population has a sizeable effect
on both absolute and relative sizes of the primate urban agglomeration. Furthermore,
negative relationship between the share of excessive population in the largest city and
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the relative size of other urban areas suggests that the increased growth of the primate
agglomeration can take place at the expense of slower population increase in the hinterland
cities. As a result, excessive population in the primate cite can substantially affect the
urbanisation processes in developing countries.
1.2.3 Robustness checks
In the previous sections I have demonstrated that better provision of public goods in the
whole country is associated with a smaller excessive population share in the largest urban
agglomeration. Furthermore, lower share of excessive population in the primate city results
into smaller primate cities, measured both in absolute and relative terms. However, as was
already mentioned above, size of the largest urban agglomeration can affect provision of
public goods at the national level. To control for this type of endogeneity, I use per capita
public expenditures as an instrumental variable for public goods. Public expenditures are
also measured at the national level, but, unlike the case of public goods, there is no reason to
consider the mean of public expenditures to be affected by the population distribution. The
results of the IV regression estimations presented in Table 1.8 confirm the validity of public
expenditures as an instrumental variable for public goods provision. Due to the fact that
standard errors are clustered at the country level and are not independent and identically
distributed, I employ Kleibergen-Paap statistics (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). Lagrange
multiplier (LM) statistic suggests that public expenditures are a relevant instrument for
public goods provision, as the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified is rejected
at 1-% level. Moreover, public expenditures can also be considered not weak, as Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic exceeds the rule-of-thumb value of 10 suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005)
in both cases.
It is important to note that the estimations of the first stage of 2SLS regressions do not
show significant relationship between the share of population living in the primate city and
public goods provision at the national level. As was already mentioned above, this effect
is ambiguous: excessive growth of the largest city with a better infrastructure allows more
people to get access to public goods, but might constrain development of the hinterland
areas and decrease public goods’ provision there. Given this, I cannot make any particular
conclusion on how population concentration in the largest city affects provision of public
goods, rather than both of the above mentioned effects can be present and none of them
prevails.
The results of the second stage of IV regressions go in line with the OLS estimations pre-
sented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. Both access to improved sanitation and water facilities have
significantly negative effect on excessive population in the largest urban agglomeration.
Moreover, this effect is becoming quantitatively stronger if I control for endogeneity. In
other words, an omitted variable (relative primate city size in this case) biases the estimated
coefficients upwards, making them less negative, while in reality an improvement in provi-
sion of public goods decreases excessive population share even more. This bias is especially
evident in case of access to water. Besides water and sanitation, Table 1.8 demonstrates
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Table 1.8: Public goods and excessive population.
Panel A: First stage
Depedent variable: sanitation water
(1) (2)
per capita public expenditures -1.062∗∗∗ -1.350∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.244)
% of pop. in primate 0.163 0.401
(0.245) (0.361)
year FE Yes Yes
controls Yes Yes
adj. R-squared 0.567 0.576
within R-squared 0.573 0.582
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 19.851∗∗∗ 22.104∗∗∗
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 29.891 30.481
Panel B: Second stage
Depedent variable: mit
(1) (2)
sanitation -0.217∗∗∗
(0.063)
water -0.170∗∗∗
(0.050)
nat. population 0.021∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006)
% of pop. in primate 1.112∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.160)
speed of urbanisation 0.188 0.380∗∗
(0.216) (0.192)
population density 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.599 0.632∗
(0.377) (0.383)
year FE Yes Yes
N 2112 2112
Number of countries 88 88
adj. R-squared 0.374 0.352
2SLS regressions with country fixed effects. Controls used at the first stage
are: national population, speed of urbanisation, population density and
log(GDP per capita). Data are from The World Bank (2018b). Standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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that the share of national population living in the largest urban agglomeration still has a
significant effect. The regression coefficient does not change substantially both in terms of
statistical significance and the magnitude, compared to the estimates in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
This result supports the hypothesis about the possible presence of self-reinforcing process
of excessive growth of the primate urban agglomerations.
1.3 Conclusion
As it has already been shown in the literature, there are many factors that can facilitate
growth of particular areas in a country. This paper contributes to the existing research
emphasising the role of public goods. Larger cities can be expected to be more financially
endowed to provide to their citizens a wider and, probably, better range of public goods,
as the data suggest. However, an increased quality of public goods attracts more migrants,
which add up to the local population, and improves survival chances in the location. This
can potentially bring more resources to the city to allocate for public goods’ provision.
However, growth of the primate city and its budget might harm other regions of the country.
This, however, might facilitate migration even more. As a result, excessive population in
the primate city might deprive development of the hinterland and give rise to the congested
urban giants. Such a situation would lead to dead-weight utility losses for the whole nation.
The described effect is expected to be especially prominent for developing countries, where
infrastructure is less developed and, hence, spatial variations in public goods provision are
more pronounced.
I estimated a set of regression equations that describe (1) share of national population
in the largest city of the country excessive to the amount that is expected to live there
given the set of country characteristics, (2) absolute and relative (compared to the total
urban population) size of the largest city, and (3) public goods’ provision at the national
level. To measure the share of excessive population I estimated synthetic populations
of the primate cities by applying the growth rate of urban areas (excluding the primate
city) in the country to the initial size of the largest city. As a result, I obtained the
value that tells how the primate city would be expected to develop if it were just an
“average” city in this country. The difference between simulated and actual population
sizes is denoted as “excessive population”. After scaling it to the national population to
control for country’s capacity to provide newcomers to the primate city, it was included
into the regression analysis. As a result, the excessive population in the largest city in the
economy is expected to be significantly influenced by the share of national population living
in the primate city and provision of public goods at the national level. Higher share of total
country’s population living in the primate city is also positively and significantly associated
with excessive population in the largest city, supporting the hypothesis that urban giants
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attract disproportionately more migrants and increase survival probability. Provision of
public goods at the national level (measured by access to water and sanitation) is negatively
associated with the share of excessive population, implying that when individuals can find
sufficient public goods outside the primate city, they are less likely to move there and have
not lower survival probability. Excessive population, in its turn, increases both absolute
and relative size of the largest urban agglomeration. On the contrast, the share of excessive
population in the primate city is significantly, but negatively correlated with the share of
national population living in other urban areas. This finding supports the hypothesis that
excessive growth of the primate areas can take place at the expense of the hinterland cities.
However, no certain conclusions can be made about the effect of increased concentration
of people in the primate city on shares of national population having access to water and
sanitation. Larger sizes of primate cities can either provide access to these public goods
to a larger number of citizens or halt infrastructure development in the hinterland areas.
Distinguishing between these two effects is an important topic for the future research.
22
1.3 Conclusion
Appendix
Data sources
All data used for Table 1.1 and Figure 1 are from the DHS Program available for the
following 57 countries:
Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo Demo-
cratic Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Moldova,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zim-
babwe.
All data used for estimations are from The World Bank (2018b). Data for access to water
and sanitation are: “Improved water source (% of population with access)” and “Improved
sanitation facilities (% of population with access)”, respectively. Regressions were run using
the data years 1991-2014; available for the following 88 countries:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Rep. of Egypt, El Salvador, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Indone-
sia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
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Table A1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
mit -0.957 3.615 -22.912 11.334
sanitation (% of population with access) 53.501 30.166 4.2 100
water (% of population with access) 77.445 17.325 29.1 100
national population (mln.) 71.627 209.992 0.51 1364.27
population in largest city (mln.) 4.034 4.716 0.127 24.953
share of total population in primate (%) 13.847 8.352 0.72 49.701
share of urban population in primate (%) 29.963 11.522 2.637 59.543
urbanisation rate (%) 47.414 21.043 5.491 95.152
urbanisation speed (%) 1.17 1.341 -0.785 16.301
population density (people per sq. km) 111.216 205.123 1.781 1768.74
ln(GDP per capita) 7.128 1.204 4.612 10.122
per capita public expenditures (1000 USD) 0.413 0.682 0.006 6.382
All data used are from The World Bank (2018b).
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Table A1.2: Correlation matrix of used control variables
water sanitation
share of total
population
in primate
national
population
population
density
urbanisation
speed ln(GDP p.c.)
p.c. public
expenditures
population in
largest city
water 1
sanitation 0.8874 1
share of total population in primate 0.387 0.4588 1
national population 0.0254 -0.0735 -0.3093 1
population density 0.1772 0.1364 -0.0467 0.1378 1
urbanisation speed -0.3689 -0.4044 -0.3038 0.1489 0.0907 1
ln(GDP per capita) 0.8162 0.8473 0.4015 -0.0667 0.1092 -0.4119 1
per capita public expenditures 0.5156 0.5631 0.1768 -0.0771 0.1029 -0.2819 0.7931 1
population in largest city 0.2269 0.162 -0.0093 0.5052 0.1555 -0.0417 0.1772 0.0476 1
All data used are from The World Bank (2018b).
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2 The Puzzle of Urban Sprawl. Now in 3d
As city populations increase, urban areas are also expected to grow to host new citizens.
Nevertheless, low incomes might constrain further growth of formal housing causing squat-
ting and congestion. Moreover, cities can expand in different dimensions: grow tall or
sprawl wide to accommodate new residents. Existing theory does not explain the following
paradox: cities occupy larger areas in developed countries, where land is relatively more
expensive than capital, while urban agglomerations in Africa and Asia do not sprawl wide
despite low land prices. This paper presents a model analysing the markets for formal
housing and its production factors. The main innovation of the model is distinguishing
between agricultural and housing land. The abundance of public amenities in the city de-
termines the intensiveness of the land improvements that have to be done privately before
erecting houses. Inclusion of land improvements into the analysis affects the price ratio of
inputs used for housing construction and explains the capital-land paradox.
JEL Codes: O18, R31, R5, R38, H4
Keywords: urban agglomerations, public goods, land area, population, density
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Introduction
People have been forming settlements since the origin of humanity. Living close to the
neighbours increased security, made possible organising some basic facilities, like a common
permanently maintained fire place or a primitive shelter. Moreover, it fostered long-term
economic development. Spatial concentration of households facilitated labour specialisa-
tion and made exchange of goods much easier and faster. After the industrial revolution
urbanisation has become crucial for further development. Growing industries required more
workers that had to be spatially concentrated in the areas, where the enterprises were lo-
cated. Eventually, population growth has led to a forming of towns and cities of different
sizes. Nowadays it is more correct to consider the metropolitan areas, rather than single
cities, as despite different names areas can be parts of a single urban agglomeration. A
person can de jure live in one city, but work in another one de facto still belonging to the
same metropolitan area. Modern means of transportation allow to travel fast and far away,
so an everyday 30-minutes journey to work can bring people formally to another city. For
example, New York and Jersey City are located in different states, but in reality belong to
the same urban agglomeration.
However, cities and even urban agglomerations cannot grow infinitely. Increasing popu-
lation size entails more crime, traffic or pollution (Mohring, 1961; Duranton and Turner,
2011; Glaeser, 2014). Some of these drawbacks cannot be properly assessed, while, for
example, higher rents are relatively easy to quantify. Disadvantages of urbanisation, re-
gardless if we can estimate them or not, might have an impact on economic outcomes, too.
Transport costs and rents are the most obvious, but far not the only factors that might
limit the further growth of the cities. Given that both advantages and disadvantages of the
urban lifestyles increase, as the city’s population grows, there is expected a certain num-
ber of residents that will maximise individual productivity in the given city. This topic
is not new to the literature and a range of studies is already devoted to it (Henderson,
1974; Fujita, 1989; Fujita et al., 1999; Duranton and Puga, 2001; Henderson, 2005; Au and
Henderson, 2006; Glaeser, 2008; Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013, 2014). Nevertheless,
a set of city-related issues remain not that extensively researched. One of them is the
concentration of people within a city.
Cities of similar population sizes have different shapes and occupy various areas. Moreover,
ideally, as population increases, housing stock should grow, at least, at a similar rate, to
avoid congestion. However, this does not always happen in reality. In this paper I attempt
to determine the factors that influence aggregate density of citizens within the city limits
and explain the overall sprawl of the urban area. This feature of urban agglomerations
should be not ignored. Even if one supposes that population density has no direct effect
on productivity growth, there is no doubt that it has a strong influence on life quality of
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those living in the cities. Slums are an example of extremely dense settlements, where
sanitation norms and comfort are drastically low. Moreover, even in the case when stock
of formal housing increases proportionately to the number or citizens, population density
might still rise. Additional dwellings can be created in two ways: buildings can grow taller
or agglomerations can sprawl wider. If people spread across the area, population dilutes,
lowering the concentration of citizens per unit of area (say, sq. km.). The existing models
(Mohring, 1961; Mills, 1980; Brueckner, 1987; Batty and Kim, 1992; Brueckner and Zenou,
1999; Brueckner et al., 1999) generally aim to explain the population distribution within
the city: areas further from the centre are typically expected to be less densely populated.
At the same time, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study explaining the ratio
between area and population of a city. What are the factors affecting the 3-dimensional
shape of cities? What are the determinants of urban sprawl? Why do densely-populated
settlements emerge in particular countries? These questions are addressed in this paper.
It is not a new fact that the majority of the most populated cities are located in the
developing countries. This holds true for the built-up areas: only 6 out of 30 largest urban
agglomerations are in high income countries. Despite being widely used in the literature
to describe how big the city is, number of residents is far not the only size characteristic of
an urban agglomeration. Moreover, concentrating solely on population sizes, researchers
ignore the important features of the settlements, like degrees of comfort or congestion. Land
area occupied by a city appears equally important characteristic of an urban agglomeration
in this context. Some cities occupy much more land than the others. When we rank all
urban areas over 500.000 residents according to their land areas, we see that the pattern
is completely different. Out of 30 cities occupying the largest land areas 14 are located in
the U.S., and 5 more are in the other highly-developed countries (see Table (A2.5)). This
is the first fact contradicting the standard theory: urban areas with the largest territory
are mostly present in the countries with high agricultural rents. One could argue that such
prevalence of the U.S. cities in the list is driven by some cultural features or the abundance
of free land in the country. However, presence of Tokyo-Yokohama or Essen-Düsseldorf in
the top-30 largest urban land areas might imply that there might be some other factors
affecting the physical size of the agglomerations. However, comparing ranks does not really
present the objective picture. For this reason it might be more reasonable to consider the
population densities in the cities. This allows to compare both number of residents and
land area in the cities simultaneously. When we take a look at the list of 30 or 40 (or even
150) most densely populated built-up areas in the Table (A2.6), none of the cities is located
in high-income regions. More formally this fact is presented on Fig.2.1. This formulates
an interesting paradox that goes against general economic intuition: cities sprawl wide
when they are expected to grow tall. Assuming that land and capital are the inputs
used for housing construction, we would expect the relatively cheaper production factor
to be used more intensively. However, land is expensive and capital is cheap in developed
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countries, meaning that following standard economic intuition, it is more reasonable to
build taller buildings rather than cultivate new land. Instead, cities sprawl wide in high-
income countries marking a discrepancy between existing theory and real data. Explaining
this paradox is the main objective of the paper.
Figure 2.1: Urban population density and income
This paper presents a theoretical model that is capable of explaining the land/capital
paradox mentioned above. One of the main innovations of the model is distinguishing
between agricultural and housing land. I argue that before a unit of land is suitable for
living, some improvements have to be undertaken. In other words, housing land has to
be produced using agricultural land and physical capital. However, the intensiveness of
necessary capital investments depends on the abundance of public goods provided by the
city: the more and better amenities are present in the city, the less has to be financed
privately. Considering physical capital aspect determining the price of land might change
the capital/land ratio, as will be demonstrated further in the paper. Finally, the model
demonstrates that financial constraints of cities in developing countries can limit the urban
sprawl and increase the population density; while larger city budgets in developed countries
allow amenities provision at a larger territory, hence, more spatially spread populations.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 present an overview of existing studies on
the topic. It highlights the gap in the literature that this paper aims to fill and justifies
the importance of the matter. Section 3 describes the model itself. Starting from general
assumptions it gradually explains the particular details of the model setting. Section 4
conducts a simple empirical testing of the model. A brief summary section in concludes
the paper.
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2.1 Existing literature
To start with, it is necessary to define explicitly, what is the object of this study. To state
the motivation of this study I use the data from World Urban Areas atlas by Demographia
(2016). The atlas aggregates the data from different sources providing information about
land areas, populations and, hence, densities of the largest metropolitan areas of the world.
It is important to note that the data is provided for built-up urban areas, a “continuously
built up land mass of urban development that is within a labour market (metropolitan area
or metropolitan region). An urban area contains no rural land (all land in the world is
either urban or rural)” (Demographia, 2016, p.4). Defining built-up areas this way allows
to concentrate on the functions that a city performs and not on the bureaucratic definition
of a city. Modern infrastructure and transport means allow people to live further from their
work and commute longer distances in shorter time. Moreover, some cities have grown in
size dramatically over years and now de jure different cities physically have merged into
one urban area. This leads to the situation that formally an individual might reside in
one city and work in the other, even though they de facto belong to the same economic
entity. Employing the built-up areas as the main object of the study puts emphasis on the
functions of the city instead of formal division into different municipalities.
The topic of this paper has not yet been studied extensively in the literature. Michaels
et al. (2012) study the relationship between initial population density and growth both
in urban and rural areas. Their study uses the past density to predict the growth and
current population in Minor Civil Divisions of the U.S., but does not consider current city
population density explicitly. However, there are two big strands of research that partially
consider the problem of population density in urban areas. First of all, there is a set of
papers that model the population distribution within a city. Starting from Clark (1951),
studies of this strand have used the distance from central business district (CBD) to predict
population density in a particular part of the city (Mills, 1980; Henderson, 2005). Brueckner
and Helsley (2011) or Brueckner et al. (1999) go further and demonstrate how mobile
residents cause rise or decay of particular city areas. Results of these studies are important
for city developers, but they do not really explain the differences in aggregate population
densities across urban agglomerations. Another strand of research considers population
distribution across existing cities. Studies by Ades and Glaeser (1995), Gabaix (1999),
Henderson (2003), Henderson and Wang (2007), Castells-Quintana (2017), Skorobogatov
(2018) and many others explain patterns of urban population distribution across the system
of cities and demonstrate possible effects of population size of one city on the whole national
economy. However, these studies also do not explain, why, given the same number of
citizens, some urban areas occupy much bigger areas than others.
Alternatively, one could refer to the studies linking city sizes to productivity to see if vari-
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ations in population density can be explained with theoretical models of these articles.
However, a range of studies by Mohring (1961), (Duranton and Puga, 2001), Henderson
(2005) or Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) link area to population size. Cities are typi-
cally assumed to be flat circles, commuting and housing costs depend on the distance from
the CBD and exogenous rents. However, these two assumptions make the models silent
about population density by construction. Assuming urban areas to be flat by definition
applies similar density in all cities. In other words, all urban areas have similar population
density: one person per one standard unit of land. This approach might be suitable to ex-
plain why cities with larger populations have higher living costs or productivity spillovers,
but completely ignores the population density in the city. Further in this paper I present
the model of a city that does not depend on the two above mentioned assumptions.
However, some studies model housing rents in a more detailed way. Brueckner and Zenou
(1999) has added the land market to Harris-Todaro model. In this formulation of the model,
city sizes are affected by agricultural rents. As city population increases, new land has to
be converted from agricultural into urban. Due to the fact that land can be universally
used, housing and agricultural rents should be equal at the city edge. This model does not
address the issue directly, but one can derive that higher agricultural rents should limit the
further growth of the city (by simply reducing the maximum distance from CBD). Thus,
between country variation in agricultural productivity (hence, land rents) could potentially
explain different city sizes. More developed countries have higher agricultural rents and are
expected to have spatially smaller cities, while those countries that are developing at the
moment can afford reallocating more (cheap) land from agriculture to housing. In reality,
this pattern does not really hold, as will be demonstrated later.
A range of classical urban models (Wheaton, 1974; Brueckner, 1987) deal with popula-
tion densities more explicitly. In the unified version of Muth-Mills model presented by
Brueckner (1987) buildings vary in size: higher land rents in the centre make the houses
taller and flats inside them smaller, while at the outskirts, where land is cheaper, houses
are flatter and individuals can afford bigger dwellings. Brueckner (1987) also considers
population density within the city. As housing costs are lower further from the centre and
people can afford larger dwellings there, population density also decreases with the dis-
tance to CBD. However, this model also ties the housing rents to the agricultural rent. As
could be expected, higher agricultural rents make cities spatially smaller, buildings taller
and dwellings tinier and more expensive. As a result, population density also increases
in agricultural rents. However, this would imply that more densely populated areas are
expected to appear in the countries with high agricultural rents. In other words, this for-
mulation of Muth-Mills model predicts that slums are more likely to emerge in developed
countries. However, productivity differences between developing and developed countries
are even larger in agriculture, compared to non-agriculture (Lagakos and Waugh, 2013).
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Given that, agricultural rents are also expected to be bigger in the high-income countries,
where in reality cities are less densely populated, as will be demonstrated later.
As was already pointed above, the mentioned studies were not designed to explain the
phenomena of population density and urban sprawl. However, as a by-product they would
predict that cities occupy smaller areas in developed countries, making us doubt the valid-
ity of the mentioned models for explaining the emergence of heavily populated settlements.
Obviously, there are two main forces that make city populations more dense. First, al-
ready mentioned, high agricultural rents decrease the amount of land available, hence, the
spatial size of the urban area. Second, urbanisation is positively associated with economic
development, so, ceteris paribus, one simply expects more urban citizens in industrialised
countries (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Henderson, 2010; Glaeser, 2014; Gollin et al., 2016). As
a result, many existing theoretical studies predict that overpopulated areas should prevail
in developed countries due to larger urban populations residing in smaller areas. However,
this contradicts the fact that urban population density is higher in developing countries
(see Fig. 2.1).
As was already suggested, there might be some proneness for the overpopulated areas to
appear in the developing countries. Jedwab and Vollrath (2018) explain this pattern by the
process of post-WWII demographic transition: countries that were already industrialised
by the end of the war had lower birth rates and did not experience rapid population growth
in the cities; while urban agglomerations in the less developed countries went on growing
due to still high birth and already low mortality rates. However, this still does not answer
the question, why did cities not sprawl in terms of land area. In this paper I come up
with one possible explanation of high population density. One of the main limitations of
the models mentioned above is equating housing land rents to agricultural rents. As a
result, these studies cannot model the population density correctly. If housing land rents
are derived solely from the agricultural ones, they are expected to be higher in developed
countries, hence, cities should occupy smaller area there. As this is not the case in the real
world (as Fig.2.2 demonstrates), there is a need for an alternative explanation. As will be
demonstrated further in this paper, distinguishing between agricultural and housing land
might solve the issue and explain the variations in population densities across the cities of
the world better.
To finish the review of existing literature on the topic, I have to explain, why is it important
to do research on heavily populated areas. Costa and Kahn (2006) demonstrate that
larger city sizes alone are associated with higher child mortality. It must be noted that
their results are derived from U.S. data from the first half of the 20th century (before
demographic transition (Haines, 2001)), but their results are robust to controlling for health
expenditures, meaning that an increase in population alone might be associated with higher
risk of disease. However, this fact does not explain the exact mechanisms that affect child
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Figure 2.2: Agricultural productivity and income
mortality in bigger cities. One of the obvious reasons for such a difference would be better
disease environment in smaller cities. Troesken (2004) convincingly demonstrates that
worse access to water and sewage systems results into higher incidence of disease, hence,
higher mortality. Moreover, this hold true not only for water-borne diseases, but also for the
other types. Connecting the infrastructure and slums, the most extreme example of highly
populated areas, we know that provision of public goods is generally substantially worse
in the poor areas (UN-Habitat, 2016). Furthermore, this holds not only for infrastructure
goods: it is quite challenging to maintain security or well-functioning road network in the
areas with high population concentration (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Duranton and Turner,
2011). As a result, low provision of various public goods in the slums leads not only to
lower life quality, but also worse economic outcomes and some kind of a poverty trap in
these areas. Formally these effects will be modelled in the next section of the paper.
2.2 The model setting
In this section I present a simple model that explains urban population density. As was
mentioned above, cities can grow tall or sprawls wide to host its citizens. This section
presents a static model that does not consider population growth, so the number of citizens
is fixed. The model demonstrates how wages, interest rates highlights public expenditures
as an important determinant of urban density.
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2.2.1 Production and income in the City
Let us assume the City to be populated by workers endowed with human capital. Similar to
Henderson (2005), aggregate production of the City is described by the following monotonic
and increasing function of human capital:
X = f(H), (2.1)
where X is total output, H is aggregate stock of human capital1.
Due to the fact that human capital is the only factor used in production of goods, workers
retain the whole output. The wage rate (per unit of input), w, then can be written as:
w =
f(H)
H
=
X
H
. (2.2)
As workers do not necessarily have identical skills, they are paid accordingly: each worker
j provides hj units of human capital, so that his labour income, yj , is expressed as:
y(hj , w) = hjw ≡ yj . (2.3)
Such formulation of yj allows the existence of different levels of income within the city.
This feature will be utilised later to explain different patterns of housing consumption.
The aggregate labour income, Y is defined as:
Y ≡ w
N∑
j=1
hj = wH, (2.4)
where N is the number of workers, i.e., total population of the City. As one can see from
Eq. (2.4), the aggregate labour income in the City is increasing in two components: larger
population (quantity) or higher average level of human capital (quality).
2.2.2 Consumption in the city
Individuals have to pay an income tax to the local government at a rate τ . The rest
of the individual income is spent on consumption of private goods, cj , and housing, mj .
I intendedly neglect qualitative features of housing. For example, price-differentiating
between locations within the city does not substantially add explanatory power to the
1Henderson (2005) enriches production function with productivity spillovers from an increased population
of the city. However, this would unnecessarily complicate the model or require us either to assume all
workers to be identical. The predictions of the model presented in this paper do not depend on the
presence or absence of productivity spillovers.
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model, but leads to a loss of generality. Instead, I concentrate on the size of the dwellings
(quantity) individuals rent. As citizens yield utility from both types of consumption, the
choice between housing and private goods can be seen as a standard utility maximisation
problem2:
max
cj ,mj
U(ci,mj) = ac log(cj − c¯) + am log(mj)
s.t. (1− τ)yj = cj + rmj , (2.5)
where is the subsistence consumption level, r is the rent per unit of housing (e.g., squared
meter) and ac, am are relative preferences for private goods’ and housing consumption,
respectively. Price of cj is normalised to unity. To survive individuals need to consume a
certain amount of private goods (e.g., food), so c¯ is the subsistence consumption level. As
a result, the optimal housing consumption of a utility-maximising citizen is:
mj = m(yj) ≡

(1−τ)yj−c¯(
1+ ac
am
)
r
, if (1− τ)yj > c¯
0 if (1− τ)yj = c¯.
(2.6)
Those individuals that cannot afford consumption above the subsistence level end up in a
sub-standard housing. This statement differs to some of the studies on the topic (Jimenez,
1985; Hoy and Jimenez, 1991; Turnbull, 2008; Brueckner and Selod, 2009; Shah, 2014;
Brueckner and Lall, 2015). Jimenez (1985) models ending up in a squatter housing as a
choice rather than a necessity. Squatters can be evicted from their dwellings with some
probability and forced to enter the formal housing market, where they will face higher
rents. However, the quality of housing is ignored in this formulation of a problem. The
model presented in this paper assumes that individuals always prefer to reside in formal
dwellings, unless their income is too low to afford it. Additionally, we can determine the
two major factors determining the emergence of sub-standard housing. Recalling Eq. (2.3)
and plugging it into inequality conditions of net income from Eq. (2.6), we can derive the
necessary condition for an individual to reside in the formal sector:
hj >
c¯
(1− τ)w ≡ h˜. (2.7)
Citizens that can afford formal residency are endowed with human capital, hj , above a
certain level that yields them income enough to survive (cj > c¯) and rent, at least, some
amount of housing. Moreover, from Eq. (2.7) we can see that a higher per hour wage rate,
w, decreases the necessary level of hj . In other words, individuals in developed countries
(where salaries are generally higher) do not need to posses exceptional skills to afford proper
2Utility function does not consider public goods explicitly, as individuals have no choice on their optimal
provision level, when no migration is allowed in the model.
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housing. On the contrast, if w is low, citizens need substantially more individual human
capital not to end up in sub-standard housing. I denote µ as the share of citizens that can
afford official housing:
µ ≡
∫ hmax
h˜
p(h)dh, (2.8)
where p(h) is a probability density function of human capital. Eq. (2.8) suggests that we
can expect µ to be substantially higher in developed countries, due to higher average level
of h (i.e., p(h) is skewed to the right).
The local government collects taxes to finance its activities (basically, to provide public
goods)3:
B = τ
N∑
j=1
yj = τwH. (2.9)
The larger governmental budget, B, the wider range and the better quality of amenities,
G, the City can offer:
G ≡ G(B, ξ), ∂G(B, ξ)
∂B
> 0 and
∂G(B, ξ)
∂ξ
> 0, (2.10)
where ξ > 0 is a parameter that determines how efficiently the governments converts funds
into public goods.
2.2.3 Housing land production
Existing studies on agglomerations by (Wheaton, 1974), Brueckner (1987) and Brueckner
and Zenou (1999) assume perfect transformability of agricultural land into housing land.
However, this leads to an interesting paradox contradicting basic economic theory. Suppose
housing is produced using physical capital and land. Then, profit-maximising construction
firms should use more intensively the production factor that is relatively cheaper. In
other words, in the countries with cheap land cities are expected to sprawl wide, and
grow tall when land is relatively more expensive. Lagakos and Waugh (2013) demonstrate
that productivity differences between developing and developed countries are higher in
agricultural sector than in industry. Hence, price of land is expected to be lower in low-
income countries, but capital should be cheaper in high-income countries. As a result,
we would expect cities in developing countries sprawl wide due to the presence of cheap
land and scarce capital. The opposite holds for developed countries with expensive land
3The ultimate goal of the paper does not require me to model the tax rate explicitly. In this setting taxes
are simply added to explain how public goods are funded. Alternatively, I could model τ as a result of
a maximisation problem of the government that aims to stay incumbent: τ = argmax[u(G(τ))− d(τ)],
where u(G(τ)) is the utility a median voter obtains from public goods and d(τ) is the utility lost due
to the paid taxes.
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and abundant capital. However, in reality the pattern is just the opposite. The largest
urban land areas are located mostly in developed countries (see Table A2.5). This pattern
becomes even more obvious if we look at population densities (Table A2.6): non of the
top-50 most populated agglomerations lies in developed countries.
This paradox can be explained by introducing the distinction between housing and agricul-
tural land. I argue that modern houses cannot be build in the plain field, but rather need a
special type of land. Agricultural land needs to be processed in a particular way to become
urban. The range of necessary land improvements is not limited solely by infrastructure.
We can also think of access to public goods in general as a required land upgrade. Besides
connection to pipelines and electricity network citizens want to have a healthcare facility or
a school within a reasonable distance. Of course, the set of land improvements that citizens
consider satisfactory might differ across countries. However, I assume that the mechanism
holds in general: houses are build on a special type of land that has to be produced using
plain (agricultural) land and capital. Physical capital is needed to connect a new land lot
to the existing infrastructure. This can be not only already mentioned pipelines and roads,
but also less material amendments, like, for example, security services. For instance, if
tenants have concerns about the efficiency of police performance, they might hire a private
company to secure their dwellings. This increases a price of land, but also makes it more
suitable for citizens. Moreover, density of available public goods around a land lot deter-
mines the required investments. If a unit of land is surrounded by different infrastructural
objects, connecting it is generally cheaper compared to the situation, when long pipelines
have to be laid to the remote lots. In other words, the more public goods are available,
the less capital you need to invest to convert it into urban land. More formally this can be
presented the following way:
lm = min{la, ekl}, e ≡ e(G), ∂e(G)
∂G
> 0, (2.11)
where la is agricultural land that you need to convert into housing land using kl, physical
capital used for land improvements. The use of Leontief production function is dictated by
the fact that agricultural land and capital are complimentary inputs. We cannot employ
more physical capital to create more land units: one lot of plain (agricultural) land will
always yield one lot of housing land. The variable e represents the “productivity” of private
capital investments into housing land. In other words, the amount of capital resources that
land developing firms have to devote to the transformation of one land unit depends on
the amount of public goods provided by the city government. It is important to note that
both qualitative and quantitative features of public goods matter for e. The larger number
of amenities is provided by the local government, the less should be generated privately
“on the spot”. The same holds for quality or density of public goods provision: the denser
is the coverage in the city, the less has to be invested into connecting to the network.
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Producing according to the Eq. (2.11) land developers hire agricultural land and physical
capital at the national market to create housing land lm that they sell at a price pl4.
Assuming that housing land market is perfectly competitive, profits of a land developer,
pil, are described the following way:
pil = pllm − lapa − kli = 0, (2.12)
where pa is a price of one lot of agricultural land, kl is a physical capital used for land
improvements and i is the interest rate. The optimal ratio of inputs in the Eq. (2.11)
is lm = la = ekl. Given this optimality condition and plugging it into Eq. (2.12) land
developers determine the price of one lot of housing land:
pl = pa +
i
e
. (2.13)
Eq. (2.13) brings a new component to the price of land suitable for housing. Existing
studies have typically neglected the second part of the expression, assuming pl = pa.
Such formulation of housing land prices is not suitable for unambiguous cross-country
comparisons: higher agricultural rents (hence, pa) are expected to be observed in countries
with higher e. However, to analyse the directions of urban sprawl we have to compare not
pl’s, but pli ratios, as will be demonstrated later, and this is already a feasible task.
2.2.4 Housing construction
Once the agricultural land was processed into a housing one, dwellings can be build on
it using physical capital, km. Unlike production of housing land itself, construction has
substitutable inputs: you can produce more dwellings employing more capital. Buildings
occupying a single lot of land can just grow taller. This technology is described by the
following production function:
m = kmlm. (2.14)
Housing market is also assumed to be perfectly competitive. The profit of construction
firms, pim, is described by the following function:
pim = kmlmr − kmi− lmpl = 0. (2.15)
4In the modern western World the distinction into capitalists and workers is not that pronounced. How-
ever, inequality still persists in all countries, indicating that some individuals posses much more assets
than the others (especially in developing countries). Given that, we can assume workers to be numer-
ous, while capitalists are few (negligible in the total population of the City compared to the number of
workers).
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A profit-maximising agent chooses the optimal kmlm ratio that can also be interpreted as a
“relative height” of buildings in the City:
km
lm
=
pl
i
=
pa
i
+
1
e
. (2.16)
From Eq. (2.16) we see the main purpose of introducing the concept of housing land.
Previous studies would explain the tallness of buildings in a city solely by pai causing
a paradox described above. We know that productivity differences between high- and
low-income countries are even higher in agriculture than in non-agriculture (Lagakos and
Waugh, 2013). Moreover, interest rates are higher in developing regions (The World Bank,
2018b). Given this, we can assume that pha > pla and ih < il, where the indices h and l stand
for high-income and low-income countries, respectively. This drives kmlm ratio in developed
countries up. This fact is not necessarily wrong: buildings in high-income regions might
be really taller compared to those in developing regions. However, if land areas of high-
income agglomerations are substantially larger, standard theory would predict the buildings
to be overproportionally higher than in developing countries. Inclusion of the e component
decreases the predicted difference in capital to land ratio between high- and low-income
countries. As B’s are expected to be higher in developed countries (implying higher G,
thus, e) and lime→∞ kmlm =
pa
i , capital to land ratio can be a good approximation for
pa
i
in high-income countries. However, in developing regions, where B’s are relatively low
and housing land needs more improvements, the e component becomes more important for
determining the capital to land ratio, making it higher compared to the case, when e is
absent. As a result, adding e as a determinant of kmlm would generally predict relatively
more required capital investments into housing construction (from scratch) compared to a
standard pai formulation, but potential bias is higher particularly for developing countries.
As was mentioned above, Eq. (2.16) does not necessarily imply that buildings are taller in
developing countries. Besides the height of the buildings larger population densities can be
explained by lower aggregate demand for housing (measured in sq. meters, but not number
of dwellings). This issue will be considered in the next section of the paper.
2.2.5 Aggregate housing demand
The lack of public funds available to expand the urban areas might be not the only factor
limiting the growth of cities in developing countries. It might be the case that citizens in
poorer countries have lower demand for housing. Combining Eq. (2.4), Eq. (2.6) and Eq.
(2.8) we can derive the aggregate demand function for housing, M :
M =
(1− τ)µ(Y −Nc¯)(
1 + acam
)
r
. (2.17)
40
2.2 The model setting
Higher wage rates and human capital levels in developed countries, which imply higher µ
and Y , drive M upwards. Obviously, if an individual earns more, he can afford to spend
more on housing. On the other hand, higher earnings might be accompanied with a higher
cost of housing. However, data suggests that as countries develop, incomes rise, at least,
as fast as rents. Fig. 2.3 presents the data from International Comparison Program (ICP
2011) for 180 countries to show how variations in per capita income affect the share of
overall expenditures devoted to housing payments. We see that there is no significant
positive correlation between these two variables, but even a slight negative one (correlation
coefficient of -0.1659, statistically significant at 5% level), meaning that the share of income
individuals spend on housing does not increase as countries get better-off. Moreover, in
general the dispersion of expenditure shares is surprisingly low across the world: households
in half of the countries spend between 10% and 20% of their disposable income on housing,
as Fig. (2.4) demonstrates. Unfortunately, no data on actual consumption of housing for
the whole world is available. Instead, the OECD provides data on 35 member-countries
and Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Fig. 2.5 demonstrates that for this set of countries we
see a very strong positive correlation between disposable income and housing consumption
(measured in number of rooms per person): the correlation coefficient of 0.8235, statistically
significant at the 0.1% level. Overall, the facts mentioned in this section imply that in
terms of our model the average yjr ratio from Eq. (2.6) is expected to increase in individual
income. In other words, as countries develop, average value of yj grows at a rate that is
higher than r. As a result, we can expect individual housing demand, mj , to be higher in
developed countries, as Fig. (2.5) actually demonstrates.
2.2.6 Urban land and density
However, higher individual housing consumption does not necessarily imply higher popula-
tion density. For example, people can comfortably live in spacious flats in skyscrapers that
occupy very little land. However, the framework developed above allows us to express the
amount of land that urban areas occupy and population density within these agglomera-
tions. Having both housing supply and aggregate demand functions determined, we can
combine Eq. (2.15), Eq. (2.16) and Eq. (2.17) to determine the total land area occupied
by the City, L:
L =
(1− τ)µ(Y −Nc¯)
2(1 + acam )(pa +
i
e)
. (2.18)
We see that L is increasing in µ and Y , the two parameters determining demand for formal
housing. The more people are able to afford a dwelling in the City, and the more they can
spend, the larger area this city occupies. On the other hand, both agricultural land price,
pa, and interest rate, i, decrease L. Having the urban land area defined, we can finally
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Figure 2.3: Housing expenditure shares and per capita GDP
Figure 2.4: Box plot of share of housing expenditures in per capita GDP
express population density in the City:
N
L
= 2
(
1 +
ac
am
)(
pa
y¯
+
i
ey¯
)
, where y¯ ≡ µ(1− τ)(Y −Nc¯)
N
. (2.19)
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Figure 2.5: Housing consumption and disposable income
Eq. (2.19) presents number of citizens per one unit of land as a function of input prices
relative to the average disposable income, y¯. If agricultural productivity is high compared
to the average disposable income of an urban citizen, we would expect, ceteris paribus,
more spatially concentrated cities. In case of physical capital, one has to compare interest
rates not only with y¯, but also consider various efficiency of capital investments determined
by public goods’ availability.
Formulation of urban densities in Eq. (2.19) allows some comparison between developing
and developed countries. By definition, average income, is higher in developing regions.
Moreover, as was explained above, µ is also expected to be higher, as population gets
richer. However, economic development increases productivity not evenly across sectors.
Caselli (2005), Restuccia et al. (2008) and Lagakos and Waugh (2013) demonstrate that
productivity differences are larger in agriculture than in non-agriculture. Models that do
not consider housing land improvements, hence, the e character in the denominator of
Eq. (2.19), would simply predict higher pay¯ ratio and, hence, lower density for developing
countries. However, in reality the pattern is just the opposite, as was argued above. The
variable e in combination with interest rates in Eq. (2.19) provides one possible explanation
for higher urban densities in developed countries, what is consistent with the data.
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2.3 Empirical evidence
Once potential determinants of urban density are revealed, it is possible to test some of
the theoretical predictions empirically. Unfortunately, most of the variables of interest
are hard to measure. Moreover, I have not made many assumptions about the functional
forms of several relationships: G(B, ξ) or e(G). We know that government expenditures
increase the amount and quality of provided public goods, but no assumptions were made
about exact elasticities. Similar holds for the efficiency of private capital investments into
production of housing land. Finally, agricultural productivity is an important, but not the
only determinant of agricultural land price. As a result, it is feasible to estimate only con-
ditional correlations of some variables with urban population density. This approach can,
nevertheless, demonstrate some support for a theoretical model presented in the previous
section.
2.3.1 Empirical strategy
To start with, I have to explain how the dependent is calculated. To estimate urban pop-
ulation density one has to scale the number of citizens residing in an urban agglomeration
with its area. Data for population sizes is widely available, for example, from adminis-
trative statistics or censuses. However, measuring urban land area is a more complicated
task, especially in developing countries, where urbanisation process is actively taking place
at the moment. The data used in this study is obtained from the Global Human Set-
tlement Layers (GHSL) by Pesaresi and Freire (2016). The GHSL is a geocoded dataset
that presents the data on land use according to the degree of urbanisation (DEGURBA)
concept by Eurostat (2018) for years 1975, 1990, 2000 and 2015. Due to data availability,
for this paper I used the all the years, except 1975. The GHSL classifies all inhabited land
as cities (densely populated areas), towns and suburbs (intermediate density) and rural
areas (scarcely populated areas) at 1-km scale. I consider all pixels that are classified as
cities and towns urban. Counting all urban pixels (size of 1 km2) at the country level yields
the size of the area that is occupied by urban settlements, regardless of their population
density. Then, I use the Gridded Population of the World dataset (CIESIN 2016) to obtain
the number of people residing in each grid cell that is considered urban. Summing up the
number of residents of urban grid cells I obtain the total urban population of the country.
Once I have both total urban land area and total urban population, I can calculate average
urban population density. This approach allows to analyse the degree of urban sprawl: do
people live close to each other or spread more remotely?
Now I can list the set of variables that can potentially explain variations in urban population
densities. As was already mentioned above, unfortunately, no data is available for any of
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the determinants as they are for a wide range of countries. Instead, I come up with a set
of proxies for each right-hand-side variable. Speaking about agricultural land, its price is
expected to increase if land becomes productive. I measure land productivity with the
value added in agriculture per one hectare of land. For the price of capital i I come up with
several proxies. First of all, the World Bank provides lending interest rate, that should be
the actual price of capital that economic agents of the country face. However, the data for
this variable is available for a limited amount of countries. Moreover, inflation rates can
play a significant role, when it comes to actual borrowing. Real interest rates provided by
the World Bank account for inflation rate, but are also not available for all countries in
the sample. Another way of measuring capital price could be marginal product of capital,
if we assume perfectly competitive market for physical capital. The Penn World Table
(Feenstra et al., 2015) provides data for the total output (GDP), physical capital stock
and share of labour compensation in GDP. Assumin Cobb-Douglas production technology,
calculation of marginal product of capital appears to be a feasible task. However, the data
for the share of labour compensation in GDP is also not universally available. Finally,
capital productivity that is available for the largest number of countries can be used as an
(imperfect) proxy for the price of physical capital. Further, regressions employing all four
measures of capital price will be demonstrated. The results are robust to the choice of a
particular indicator.
As Eq.(2.19) demonstrates, population density is expected to decrease in the efficiency
of private capital investments, e. According to Eq. (2.11) e is higher if public goods
are well provided. In other words, we can expect private land investments to be more
efficient in the areas with high level of public amenities. As a result, population density is
expected to decrease in the amount of public goods. I proxy public goods with an index
of infrastructural goods provided in urban areas of the country. To estimate this index, I
calculate a simple average of the following variables: share of urban population with access
to improved water source, sanitation facilities, electricity and non-solid fuel. The intuition
behind this approach is quite simple: if the existing infrastructural networks in urban areas
are adequate (provide access to these public goods to everyone who requires it), the city
can sprawl further. If the level of infrastructure is too low to satisfy the demand for all
citizens, new residents will aim to concentrate around the existing infrastructural focal
points. Of course, the four types of public goods do not represent the full set of amenities
that a city can offer, but they are easy to measure and are assumed to be correlated with
other types of public goods (see (Yakubenko, 2018) for a detailed argumentation of this
statement). Due to the fact that levels of public goods provision are typically correlated
between each other, I cannot include them simultaneously and aggregate using a simple
average. This approach is based on the assumption of similar preferences towards each
amenity, but allows for some degree of substitution between particular goods (e.g., “I have
no electricity, but, at least water is there”).
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The last determinant of urban population density from Eq. (2.19) is the average disposable
income of an urban citizen, y¯. A simple GDP per capita can also capture the productivity
in agriculture, hence, correlate with land productivity. I assume that urban residents
are primarily employed in manufacturing and services, while agriculture is the primary
activity in rural areas. Then, to separate urban and rural incomes, I subtract value added
in agriculture from total GDP and divide this value by the total urban population. The
obtained value is not a precise estimate of the average income of an urban citizen, if we
think about non-agricultural activities of rural residents. However, the calculated variable
can be assumed to be independent from agricultural productivity.
Regression estimates presented in this article are obtained through ordinary least squares
estimator (OLS). Ideally, one should use a country fixed effect (FE) estimator that will
allow to control for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics that can affect city
sprawl. However, the data structure does not fit the FE technique. First of all, the time
dimension of the data is available only for three periods and the panel is unbalanced,
so that there is not enough variation for many countries of the sample. Secondly, the
main purpose of this exercise is to explore the variation between developed and developing
countries. However, level of public goods provision in cities of many developed countries
has reached 100%-level by the first period of the panel (1990). Absence of time-variation
of the main variable of interest for a substantial part of the sample is another reason not
to use a FE estimator. Instead, I employ plenty of control variables that capture various
country characteristics.
The model presented above assumes no migration to focus on the importance of public
goods for determination of urban sprawl, but in reality one has to account for some pop-
ulation dynamics. Urbanisation rate can be a good indicator of how many new citizens
are expected to arrive to urban areas. If a substantial share of population resides in ru-
ral areas, massive migration to urban areas appears more likely. Once cities face a large
amount of migrants, they might lack time to sprawl wide to accommodate new citizens. In
this context, we also need to consider total population of a country: the more people there
are, the larger is the pool of potential migrants. Other control variables employed in the
regression analysis can be split into three categories listed below:
1. Land features
Agricultural productivity can be not the only factor that affects the price of agricultural
land and, hence, the extent of urban sprawl. First of all, due to a limited amount of land
available, we can expect the market for agricultural land to be inelastic. As a result, land
scarcity can also affect the price of agricultural land. To control for land supply (currently
and potentially), I add the amount of agricultural and total land of the country. Moreover,
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not all land can be used for agriculture, so to consider this I include land suitability for
agriculture and its Gini coefficient variables. Higher land suitability is expected to increase
the land price, as agricultural use option appears more profitable. Besides availability of
public goods there are other factors that determine the capital intensity of processing land
for construction. One of the factors that can complicate the process of land conversion
is terrain roughness. Moreover, elevation might be a factor that limits the urban sprawl.
However, a country might be just located on an elevated plateau. So, besides average
elevation level, one has to consider how much it varies, so the standard deviation of elevation
is also included into the regression.
2. Geographic features
Other geographic variables, not directly related to the land characteristics, might affect ur-
ban sprawl. To control for climate, I include variables of latitude and longitude (geographic
centroids), average temperature and precipitation. Besides that, Bleakley and Lin (2012)
have demonstrated that proximity to a river can be crucial for economic development of a
city and population density of the area. To control if average proximity to water has an
effect of urban sprawl I add the percentage of land near a waterway variable.
3. Cultural features
What if living in densely-populated settlements is just a cultural feature? Part of this can
be captured by the share of housing expenditures in total expenditures of a household. In
some countries individuals might just have higher relative preference for housing (am in
terms of Eq. (2.5). Besides this, “favouring congestion” habit might be correlated with some
other features that constitute the national culture. For example, in case of ex-colonies, the
share of population of European descent can be a way to compare their cultural similarity
to the European states. Furthermore, ethnic fractionalisation can motivate people to live
further from a rival ethnic group, sprawling the city wider. Finally, religion is a very
important determinant of culture, so I control for its effect including shares of population
attributed to one of the main religious confessions.
As a result, the estimated regression equation looks the following way:
yit = β0 + β
′Xit + γ′Zit + λt + εit, (2.20)
where yit is urban population density, Xit is a vector of main explanatory variables: land
productivity, capital price, public goods and non-agricultural GDP. Zit is a vector of aux-
iliary controls, explained above, λt is a year fixed effect and εit is an error term.
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2.3.2 Empirical results
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate the results of the estimation of the regression model de-
scribed in Eq.(2.20) without auxiliary controls. The estimated coefficients follow the predic-
tions of the theoretical model presented above. Agricultural productivity, that is assumed
to raise the price of land, increases urban population density. Better provision of public
goods decreases density, supporting the hypothesis that better development of infrastruc-
ture allows cities to sprawl wider. These results are robust to inclusion of non-agricultural
per capita GDP, that also has the predicted sign - higher income allows citizens to consume
more housing, thus, increasing area that cities occupy. Interestingly, price of capital has a
non-significant coefficient, regardless of the proxy employed5. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 demon-
strate that the results are generally robust to inclusion of additional controls, especially if
we concentrate on the primary variable of interest - index of public goods. However, land
productivity and non-agricultural income lose significance, once I add urbanisation rate. I
suppose that the three variables are correlated with each other and can be considered an
indicator of overall development of a country. When land becomes more productive (par-
tially due to better quality of labour), less employers are needed in agriculture, so more
people can migrate to urban areas to concentrate on non-agricultural activities. Simulta-
neously, when income in a city is higher, it becomes more attractive to migrate there from
rural areas.
To sum up, this section has demonstrated some support for the predictions of the theory
section: urban population density is increasing in land productivity, that serves as a proxy
for price of agricultural land, while public goods and urban income decrease it. However,
no effect of capital price variables employed in this study was detected. There might
be several reasons for this result. First of all, used proxies can be bad indicators of the
price for physical capital. Secondly, one can expect both land and labour to become
more productive if capital endowment increases. In other words, cheap capital enables
higher productivity, hence, increased wages of other production factors. Even though
Table A2.2 demonstrates that land productivity, non-agricultural GDP and each of capital
price indicators demonstrate correlation coefficient quantitatively way below the threshold
level of 0.8 implying multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003), one can still expect the effect of
capital price to be captured by the other two variables. Disentangling these effects and
more thorough empirical testing of the theoretical model are indeed important topics for
future research. This paper, nevertheless, argues that lack of public goods can limit sprawl
of urban areas, thus increasing urban population density.
5Tables A2.3 and A2.4 present the results of marginal product of capital and real interesting rate, respec-
tively, as the indicators of capital price. Results remain robust to the choice of the proxy.
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Table 2.1: Determinants of urban density. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: urban population density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
land productivity 0.105∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050) (0.047) (0.045)
lending interest rate 3.121 4.217 0.622 1.900
(3.822) (4.361) (4.000) (4.447)
public goods index -19.546∗∗∗ -19.070∗∗∗ -15.438∗∗ -14.731∗∗
(6.438) (6.474) (6.646) (6.705)
non-agricultural GDP p.c. -0.016∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
year FE No Yes No Yes
N 210 210 209 209
Number of countries 107 107 107 107
Adj. R-squared 0.112 0.119 0.143 0.154
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.2: Determinants of urban density. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: urban population density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
land productivity 0.084 0.079 0.130∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.045) (0.043)
capital productivity 20.262 5.215 -133.468 -140.992
(142.612) (162.739) (132.757) (151.919)
public goods index -22.008∗∗∗ -21.969∗∗∗ -17.382∗∗∗ -17.138∗∗∗
(4.552) (4.555) (4.694) (4.686)
non-agricultural GDP p.c. -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
year FE No Yes No Yes
N 329 329 327 327
Number of countries 128 128 128 128
Adj. R-squared 0.150 0.151 0.212 0.219
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Determinants of urban density. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: urban population density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
land productivity 0.081∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.053 0.125∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.055) (0.045) (0.047) (0.043) (0.058)
capital productivity -185.420 -117.152 -185.168 -111.744 -188.175 -243.920∗ -137.116 -84.149
(148.905) (149.379) (140.302) (150.307) (164.208) (133.118) (156.413) (156.703)
public goods index -15.069∗∗ -17.307∗∗∗ -10.543∗ -15.349∗∗∗ -17.160∗∗∗ -24.080∗∗∗ -16.922∗∗∗ -26.698∗∗∗
(7.404) (4.734) (5.571) (4.565) (6.269) (3.852) (5.229) (6.819)
non-agricultural GDP p.c. -0.007∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.007∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
urbanisation rate 4226.994∗∗∗ 2921.605∗∗∗
(830.279) (756.477)
population 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
housing share -235.943 -1126.329
(1633.173) (1681.115)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
continent FE Yes No No No No No No Yes
land features No Yes No No No No No Yes
geographic controls No No Yes No No No No Yes
legal origin No No No Yes No No No Yes
culture No No No No Yes No No Yes
N 327 323 325 327 322 327 327 318
Number of countries 128 126 127 128 125 128 128 123
Adj. R-squared 0.292 0.269 0.280 0.270 0.367 0.417 0.217 0.556
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Determinants of urban density. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: urban population density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
land productivity 0.087∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.058 0.004
(0.050) (0.033) (0.042) (0.060) (0.051) (0.044) (0.047) (0.057)
lending interest rate 0.304 3.128 4.506 1.210 5.411 2.481 4.909 3.003
(4.582) (4.855) (4.773) (4.194) (4.292) (4.288) (3.813) (4.832)
public goods index -19.453∗ -15.413∗∗ -9.971 -15.257∗∗ -17.968∗ -13.503∗ -21.772∗∗∗ -33.507∗∗∗
(9.962) (7.033) (7.970) (6.459) (9.352) (7.163) (4.894) (8.628)
non-agricultural GDP p.c. -0.008 -0.016∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.003 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
housing share -1621.953 -2533.674
(1636.231) (1686.333)
urbanisation rate 4376.568∗∗∗ 2914.625∗∗∗
(1027.564) (818.367)
population 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
continent FE Yes No No No No No No Yes
land features No Yes No No No No No Yes
geographic controls No No Yes No No No No Yes
legal origin No No No Yes No No No Yes
culture No No No No Yes No No Yes
N 209 205 207 209 208 209 209 204
Number of countries 107 105 106 107 106 107 107 104
Adj. R-squared 0.230 0.173 0.165 0.208 0.305 0.158 0.399 0.543
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of an urban agglomeration that explains the differences in
urban population densities between developed and developing countries. First of all, cit-
izens in poorer countries are more likely to be financially constrained to afford formal
housing. On the contrast, higher average wages and human capital levels in high-income
regions prevent individuals from settling informally. Secondly, there is some evidence that
higher income is associated with more housing consumption. This relation holds despite
the fact that per unit housing rents are expected to increase as countries develop. The
straightforward explanation for this fact would be that incomes grow at a higher rate than
rents. Overall, lower population densities in the cities of developed world can be partially
explained by larger housing stock. However, this factor alone cannot explain the physical
shapes of the cities. As populations of cities increase, urban areas are expected to expand.
A city can grow tall or sprawl wide to host the same number of residents. Assuming that
land and physical capital are needed to produce housing, and employing general economic
intuition we would expect tall buildings in the areas with relatively expensive land, and flat,
but sprawled agglomerations, when land is cheap. However, in reality cities in developed
countries, where capital-land price ratio is supposed to be low, occupy larger land areas
than agglomerations in developing countries, where land is expected to be much cheaper
than capital. This paper points out and explains this obvious discrepancytr between the
existing literature on the matter and the real data. The theoretical model described in
this paper considers necessary improvements to agricultural land that are required before
erecting houses. Abundance of public infrastructure in the city determines the intensity of
land improvements that are needed to be done privately. If a local government provides
public goods at a high scale, connecting additional lot of land to the existing network is
relatively cheap. However, when amenities are scarce, substantial investments are needed
to be done privately in order to make a land unit suitable for housing. As a result, the
presented model is capable of explaining what makes a city sprawl wide or grow tall.
This paper fills the gap in the existing theoretical literature. These findings can be useful
for future research and also can help shaping efficient policy for city government. Ex-
tremely densely populated urban areas waste utility and might be physically harmful for
its residents. This model formally demonstrates potential ways to deal with the problem of
overconcentration. Local government can allocate funds in different ways to decrease pop-
ulation concentration. First of all, higher incomes allow more housing consumption. This
fact is quite obvious, but increase in the dwellings size not necessarily leads to population
dilution, as buildings can just grow taller. Moreover, the model demonstrates that popu-
lation concentration might even increase. If a local budget grows slower than individual
incomes, due to whatever reason, a city will grow tall, increasing the number of residents
per a unit of land. Furthermore, the local taxes have an ambiguous effect: lower taxes allow
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citizens spend more on housing, but decreased public funds constrain the urban sprawl.
This aspect is an important topic for the future research. Finally, a city government can
facilitate land area growth in two ways. First option is to subsidise cultivation of new ur-
ban land (namely, decrease the price of “raw”, agricultural land or lower the interest rates).
However, further development of public infrastructure can serve the same purpose, as it
increases the effectiveness of necessary private investments into new land. Determining
which of these two strategies is more efficient and more rigorous empirical testing of the
model are promising topic for the further research.
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Appendix
Data sources of used variables
Variable urban population density is calculated by the author using the Global Human Set-
tlement Layers by Pesaresi and Freire (2016) the Gridded Population of the World dataset
(CIESIN 2016) using Google Earth Engine. Land productivity is calculated using the data
for value added in agriculture and agricultural land provided by FAOSTAT. Lending inter-
est rate and real interest rate, public goods variables, total population are taken from The
World Bank (2018b). Marginal product of capital and capital productivity are calculated
using the data from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015). Urban population is
calculated from the Gridded Population of the World dataset (CIESIN 2016) using Google
Earth Engine - this variable was not employed explicitly in the analysis, but was used
for calculation of non-agricultural per capita GDP and urbanisation rate. Housing share
is calculated using the ICP data (The World Bank, 2018a). Major religion shares, legal
origin, average land elevation, standard deviation of land elevation, terrain roughness, land
suitability for agriculture, Gini of land suitability, geographic centroid latitude and longi-
tude, average temperature and precipitation levels, share of land area near to a waterway,
share of population of European descent and ethnic fractionalisation are taken from the
Ashraf and Galor (2013) dataset. Total land area is taken from FAOSTAT.
Table A2.1: Summary statistics of selected variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
urban density 504 2642.436 1440.685 0 11901.78
land productivity 437 2095.995 8913.347 2.390 143271.5
lending interest rate 308 32.071 271.535 1.143 4774.525
real interest rate 302 7.191 13.554 -97.616 67.159
MPK 381 0.333 1.867 0.042 35.026
capital productivity 504 0.711 3.981 0.116 85.164
public goods 383 82.169 21.360 25.906 100
urban GDP 362 11458.57 21233.62 65.079 185342.1
urbanisation rate 498 0.713 0.164 0 1
population (mln.) 498 36.7 133 59326 1370
housing share 493 0.151 0.077 0.024 0.482
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Table A2.2: Correlation matrix of selected variables
density
land
productivity
lending
interest
rate
realinterest
rate
M
P
K
capitalproductivity
public
goods
urban
G
D
P
urbanisation
rate
population
housing
share
density 1.000
land productivity 0.344 1.000
lending interest rate 0.024 -0.124 1.000
real interest rate 0.000 0.050 -0.122 1.000
MPK -0.002 0.283 0.025 0.095 1.000
capital productivity -0.008 0.275 0.008 0.078 0.999 1.000
public goods -0.378 0.298 -0.033 -0.012 -0.332 -0.290 1.000
urban GDP -0.332 0.380 -0.281 0.015 -0.243 -0.262 0.411 1.000
urbanisation rate 0.396 -0.005 -0.005 0.024 -0.169 -0.1370 0.192 -0.163 1.000
population 0.134 -0.026 -0.014 -0.013 -0.021 -0.018 0.067 -0.043 0.181 1.000
housing share -0.127 -0.088 -0.038 0.041 -0.016 -0.003 0.157 -0.201 -0.034 -0.100 1.000
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Table A2.3: Determinants of urban density. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: urban population density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
land productivity 0.070 0.064 0.110∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.045) (0.044)
public goods index -24.825∗∗∗ -24.760∗∗∗ -19.967∗∗∗ -19.586∗∗∗
(5.043) (5.074) (5.293) (5.318)
MPK 91.384 79.590 -140.601 -118.856
(293.322) (331.692) (286.248) (322.155)
non-agricultural GDP p.c. -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
year FE No Yes No Yes
N 266 266 266 266
Number of countries 104 104 104 104
Adj. R-squared 0.185 0.187 0.254 0.267
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2.4: Determinants of urban density. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: urban population density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
land productivity 0.100∗ 0.094∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.045)
real interest rate 3.646 3.338 4.087 3.532
(5.512) (5.610) (5.748) (5.833)
public goods index -19.806∗∗∗ -19.417∗∗∗ -15.418∗∗ -14.767∗∗
(6.459) (6.457) (6.671) (6.705)
non-agricultural GDP p.c. -0.016∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
year FE No Yes No Yes
N 210 210 209 209
Number of countries 107 107 107 107
Adj. R-squared 0.112 0.117 0.145 0.155
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2.5: World’s 40 largest urban land areas
Country Urban Area Population
estimate
Land
area
(km2)
Population
density
1 United States New York 20,685,000 11,642 1,800
2 Japan Tokyo-Yokohama 37,750,000 8,547 4,400
3 United States Chicago 9,185,000 6,856 1,300
4 United States Atlanta 5,120,000 6,851 700
5 United States Los Angeles 15,135,000 6,299 2,400
6 United States Boston 4,490,000 5,325 800
7 Russia Moscow 16,570,000 5,310 3,100
8 United States Dallas-Fort Worth 6,280,000 5,175 1,200
9 United States Philadelphia 5,595,000 5,131 1,100
10 United States Houston 6,005,000 4,828 1,200
11 China Beijing 20,390,000 3,937 5,200
12 China Shanghai 22,685,000 3,885 5,800
12 Japan Nagoya 10,035,000 3,885 2,600
14 China Guangzhou-Foshan 18,760,000 3,820 4,900
15 United States Detroit 3,660,000 3,463 1,100
16 United States Washington 4,950,000 3,424 1,300
17 Indonesia Jakarta 31,320,000 3,225 9,700
17 United States Phoenix 4,295,000 3,225 1,300
19 Japan Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto 16,985,000 3,212 5,300
20 United States Miami 5,820,000 3,209 1,700
21 United States Seattle 3,475,000 2,989 1,100
22 France Paris 10,870,000 2,845 3,700
23 United States San Francisco-San Jose 5,955,000 2,797 2,100
24 Brazil Sao Paulo 20,605,000 2,707 7,600
25 Argentina Buenos Aires 14,280,000 2,681 5,300
26 Germany Essen-Dusseldorf 6,675,000 2,655 2,500
27 United States Minneapolis-St. Paul 2,795,000 2,647 1,000
28 South Africa Johannesburg-East Rand 8,655,000 2,590 3,300
28 South Korea Seoul-Incheon 23,575,000 2,590 9,100
28 Thailand Bangkok 15,315,000 2,590 5,900
31 Australia Melbourne 3,955,000 2,543 1,500
32 United States Tampa-St. Petersburg 2,660,000 2,479 1,000
33 United States St. Louis 2,195,000 2,393 900
34 United States Pittsburgh 1,730,000 2,344 700
35 Canada Toronto 6,550,000 2,287 2,900
36 US: Puerto Rico San Juan 2,135,000 2,246 1,000
37 India Delhi 25,735,000 2,163 11,900
38 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 7,365,000 2,124 3,500
39 Mexico Mexico City 20,230,000 2,072 9,800
40 United States Orlando 2,125,000 2,046 1,000
All data is from Demographia (2016). Population densities indicate number of citizens per km2.
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Table A2.6: World’s 40 most densely populated areas
Country Urban Area Population
estimate
Land
area
(km2)
Population
density
1 Bangladesh Dhaka 16,235,000 368 44,100
2 Pakistan Hyderabad 2,990,000 73 41,200
3 India Vijayawada 1,775,000 57 31,200
4 Bangladesh Chittagong 3,250,000 111 29,200
5 India Mumbai 22,885,000 881 26,000
6 China: Hong Kong Hong Kong 7,280,000 285 25,600
7 India Aligarh 1,050,000 41 25,300
8 China: Macau Macau 655,000 26 25,300
9 Syria Hamah 1,300,000 52 25,100
10 Somalia Mogadishu 2,265,000 91 25,000
11 India Surat 5,685,000 233 24,400
12 Pakistan Karachi 22,825,000 945 24,100
13 Syria Al-Raqqa 745,000 31 24,000
14 India Kannur 2,160,000 91 23,800
15 India Ranchi 1,280,000 57 22,500
16 India Malegaon 675,000 31 21,700
17 Congo (Dem. Rep.) Tshikapa 730,000 34 21,700
18 India Gwalior 1,235,000 57 21,700
19 India Madurai 1,615,000 75 21,500
19 India Rajkot 1,615,000 75 21,500
19 Philippines General Santos 1,615,000 75 21,500
22 Indonesia Tasikmalaya 830,000 39 21,400
23 India Ahmadabad 7,410,000 350 21,200
24 India Guntur 765,000 36 21,100
25 India Kozhikode 2,495,000 119 20,900
26 India Muzaffarnagar 595,000 28 20,900
27 India Asansol 1,335,000 65 20,600
27 India Salem 1,015,000 49 20,600
29 Syria Hims 1,705,000 83 20,600
30 India Firozabad 585,000 28 20,500
31 India Saharanpur 790,000 39 20,300
32 Pakistan Faisalabad 3,675,000 181 20,300
33 Pakistan Larkana 520,000 26 20,100
34 Congo (Dem. Rep.) Bukavu 880,000 44 20,000
34 India Moradabad 1,035,000 52 20,000
36 Egypt Al Mahallah al Kubra 510,000 26 19,700
37 India Bhavnagar 660,000 34 19,600
38 Congo (Dem. Rep.) Kinshasa 11,380,000 583 19,500
39 Syria Lattakia 795,000 41 19,200
40 India Siliguri 840,000 44 19,100
All data is from Demographia (2016). Population densities indicate number of citizens per km2.
58
3 Burnt by the sun. Explaining suicide in
developing countries
More than 800.000 people commit suicide every year - around one person every 40 seconds.
Despite the popular stereotypes, around 75% of suicides occur in low- and middle-income
countries. Nevertheless, the vast majority of studies of suicide is conducted in developed
countries undermining their external validity. This paper takes advantage of the macro data
and analyses fundamental factors determining cross-country variations in suicide rates.
The main novelty of the study is introduction of ultra-violet radiation as a key factor
affecting incidence of suicide. As a result, this paper documents a striking contrast between
the major determinants of suicide in developed and developing countries. While biology
explains a substantial part of cross-country variation in high-income countries, suicide
rates in the developing world are primarily driven by a range of social factors (e.g., adult
mortality). These findings are crucial for designing an efficient suicide-preventing policy.
JEL codes: I12, I18, Q51, Q54
Keywords: suicide, health, solar radiation, adult mortality
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Introduction
Suicide is a personal tragedy. It affects not only individuals that have decided to take their
own lives, but also their families, friends, colleagues. The taboo and social stigma around
suicide keeps the topic away from an active public discussion and fosters the emergence of
unjustified and misleading stereotypes. However, suicide is clearly a public health problem,
as 800,000 people die by suicide every year (WHO, 2014). Carefully tailored mental health
plans can reduce the number of self-murders. To develop an efficient strategy to tackle
suicide we need to better understand the factors causing it. This paper focuses on the
fundamental determinants of suicide that can explain the variation in suicide rates across
countries.
Despite the fact that suicide is a personal decision taken at the micro level, there is still
a number reasons to study this phenomenon at the cross-country level. First of all, one
has to consider the difference in factors that can be captured at different levels of analysis.
There exist several studies conducted at the individual level (Hakko et al., 1998; Cutler
et al., 2001; Phillips et al., 2002; Andres and Halicioglu, 2010; Daly et al., 2013; Case and
Deaton, 2015a), but, due to numerous reasons (e.g., privacy concerns or local ethics norms),
individual data on suicide is rarely available, so more studies employ some degree of data
aggregation. For example, Koo and Cox (2008), Chan et al. (2014), Madianos et al. (2014)
conduct their analyses using the evolution of national suicide rates over time, while Ahlburg
and Schapiro (1984), Mathur and Freeman (2002) and Case and Deaton (2015b) analyse the
variation at the U.S. state level. Studies employing aggregated data (including this paper)
do not aim to answer the question why those particular people committed suicide, but
rather why so many did it in a certain region. In other words, cross-country analysis does
not identify the individual triggers, but allows to capture some more fundamental factors,
like ultra-violet radiation (UVR) or mortality considered in this paper, that determine the
probability of an average citizen of the country to commit suicide.
Moreover, studying suicide from a cross-country perspective can help to overcome concerns
about the out-of-sample validity of the results. The majority of related existing studies are
conducted using figures from developed countries (e.g., Andres 2005; Andres et al. 2011;
Okada and Samreth 2013; Jalles and Andresen 2015), since statistical capacities there
provide a wider range of data. However, WHO (2014) argues that 75% of the World’s
suicides occur in low- and middle-income countries. Partially this can be noticed if we
plot suicide rates on the map of the World (Fig.3.1). Moreover, conclusions drawn from
studies conducted in high-income countries are not necessarily applicable to developing
ones. Therefore, the driving forces of suicide can differ across countries even more than
within a country, especially if we speak about such fundamental factors as culture or
religion (Durkheim, 1951; Helliwell, 2007). A range of prominent studies by Gunnell and
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Figure 3.1: Age-standardised male suicide rate in 2000
Eddleston (2003), Das (2011) Gruere and Sengupta (2011), Mahfoud et al. (2011), Toprak
et al. (2011), Patel et al. (2012), Ramim et al. (2013), Qaisar et al. (2014) and Machado
et al. (2015) do a great effort to overcome this problem focusing on developing countries,
but they typically concentrate either on particular drivers or countries. However, this
approach limits the external validity of the findings for the states not included into the
analysis. Similar to Neumayer (2003); Milner et al. (2012) this article considers differences
between countries at different stages of economic development for explaining variations in
suicide rates.
This article contributes to the literature that links natural factors with health outcomes
(e.g., Dalgaard and Strulik (2015); Andersen et al. (2016); Dalgaard and Strulik (2016))
and human behaviour (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2001); Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009); Ashraf
and Galor (2013); Strulik (2017))1. I argue that between-country variation in UVR expo-
sure is a potential fundamental determinant of suicide that acts through biological channels
that are, unlike cultural aspects, valid in all countries of the world. This effect is robust
to inclusion of a set of socio-economic variables, like income, employment, religion or mor-
tality. Nevertheless, some socio-economic variables, especially adult mortality, also have
a significant effect on suicide rates. Moreover, this study argues that the lack of UVR
distorts normal functioning of the body and promotes suicide in developed countries that
mostly lie in darker areas, while adult mortality contributes to higher suicides in developing
countries, where people expect to have shorter lives.
This paper is organised the following way. Section 2 summarises existing medical studies
to distinguish factors that can potentially affect suicide rates and integrates them into a
simple economic model that simplifies the understanding of complex biological processes
for the purpose of this study. Section 3 describes empirical methodology and data. Section
4 presents the results of regression analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
1For a more detailed review see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013)
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3.1 Theory of suicide
Suicide can be explained by a wide variety of factors. Moreover, it is attempted to be
explained by different fields of science. On one hand, medicine (namely psychiatry) and
psychology try to explain the phenomenon from physiological point of view. On the other
hand, social sciences as sociology and economics try to analyse human behaviour and
factors affecting it. Sometimes these two strands of science go against each other. In this
paper I attempt to link major biological factors established in the medical literature with
existing economic theories of suicide.
3.1.1 Biology of suicide
Despite often being a striking event for families and friends, suicides do not happen com-
pletely out of the blue. Typically, victims of suicide indicate their need for help in some
ways even though that might be not noticed by surrounding people (WHO, 2014). Given
this fact I can suppose that individuals committing suicide are likely to be affected by a
particular condition that does not kill them immediately. Medical literature suggests that
one of the major factors developing suicidal behaviour is depression. There exist numerous
studies demonstrating positive link between depression and suicide (see Beskow (1990) for
a detailed summary of the literature on the topic). People affected by depression are at
a high risk of committing suicide (Lynch and Duval, 2011). As a result, I can consider
suicide as a complication of depression. Even though there is no evidence for existence
of one major cause of depression, there are several factors associated with it. Once we
identify these potential causes of depression, we can analyse if the same drivers can be
used to predict suicide rates.
First of all, depression is normally provoked by some stressful event (Burrows, 1977; Risch
et al., 2009). However, individuals can react to these occasions differently: not everyone
becomes depressed after loosing a job or having a divorce. Besides individual preferences,
the likelihood of a certain stressful experience initiating depression might be affected by
genetics. All events in our life provoke an influx of serotonin into the space between neu-
rons to activate serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, 5-HT) receptors (Beliveau et al., 2017).
Some of the 5-HT receptors are responsible for such functions as regulation of anxiety or
mood(Tatarczynska et al., 2004; Young, 2007). Different combinations of these two func-
tions can yield emotions that people describe as “happiness” or “unhappiness”. However,
a functional polymorphism (basically, difference in forms) of the serotonin transporter (5-
HTT) can regulate the sensitivity of individuals to different stressful events (Caspi et al.,
2003; Kendler et al., 2005; Goldman et al., 2010; Karg et al., 2011). In other words, the
same event can be very stressful and cause depression of one individual, but not affect the
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other and the reason for it is individual’s genetics. As a result, we can expect a particular
(genetically determined) form of 5-HTT to be suicide-promoting (Lee et al., 2015).
Besides genetics, there exist other factors that make people to be more prone to depression.
Some studies argue that lower availability of serotonin may be a crucial factor in depres-
sion(Meltzer, 1989; Kambeitz and Howes, 2015). However, currently there is a big debate
in the literature if this is truly the case (Cowen and Browning, 2015; Healy, 2015). I do
not aim to contribute to this discussion, but rather use potential theoretical mechanism
that has been successfully applied for therapy. A range of studies suggests that serotonin
is positively associated with light. By “light” we can mean sun light in general (Petridou
et al., 2002; Lambert et al., 2002; Sansone and Sansone, 2013) or more precisely defined
ultra-violet radiation (UVR) (Iyengar, 1994; Zawilska et al., 2007). If we believe serotonin
to be efficient for depression prevention, we can expect exposure to solar radiation to be
negatively correlated with depression. Moreover, the existing literature suggests that even
if serotonin levels play no role in depression occurrence, there must be other ways for light
to affect people’s mood. Currently, bright light therapy (BLT) is an accepted treatment op-
tion for depression (Mårtensson et al., 2015). Both exposure to BLT (Eastman et al., 1998;
Young, 2007; Al-Karawia and Jubair, 2016) or solar radiation (Eastman, 1990; Gambichler
et al., 2002) can be efficient for treating various types of depression. Similar beneficial ef-
fects of the sun light are observed if suicide rates are considered (Lambert et al., 2003). As
a result, regardless of the particular channel, we can expect higher levels of UVR exposure
to be negatively associated with suicide rates2.
To sum this section up, the existing studies of depression and suicide claim that various
stressful life events can provoke depression. Acute forms of depression can lead to suicide.
However, individual vulnerability depends on a set of various biological factors. In this
paper I concentrate on the two potential drivers, that I can, at least, try to measure
at the population level: genetics and environment (namely, UVR). Firstly, some people
(or populations) might be genetically predetermined to be more stressed, hence, more
vulnerable to depression. Secondly, lack of UVR can contribute to higher depression rates
that, in turn, result into more suicides.
3.1.2 Economics of suicide
Even though biology plays crucial role in the mechanisms of suicide, we have to consider
other factors that can be potential drivers. Different economic and social conditions can be
considered as stress factors that trigger depression or suicide. Since Durkheim economists
2It is important to remember that excessive exposure to solar radiation can be harmful for general health:
skin cancer or cataract are the most common threats (Lucas et al., 2006). Even though these diseases do
not necessarily cause immediate depression, they can raise stress levels that, in turn, cause depression.
This issue will be addressed in the Section 3.3.1.
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and sociologists tend to explain suicides with various models of human behaviour. These
theories do not necessarily oppose the biological mechanisms, moreover, they can be in-
tegrated into physiological models of suicide. Existing economic literature often lists low
incomes (Helliwell, 2007; Andres and Halicioglu, 2010; Daly et al., 2013) and unemployment
(Andres, 2005; Chang et al., 2013; Jalles and Andresen, 2015) among the drivers of suicide.
From biological point of view, these can be seen as stressful life events. If we talk about
stress, we normally imagine some sudden and unexpected changes in life, however, persis-
tent states (e.g., long-term poverty) can also raise stress levels (Baum, 1990). Furthermore,
Minkoff et al. (1973); Kovags et al. (1975); Beck et al. (1985) identified hopelessness (more
precisely defined as the cognitive element of negative expectations), which is a component
of the depression syndrome, as a stronger indicator of suicidal intent than depression itself.
In other words, when individuals do not see perspective in their life, they are more likely
to commit suicide.
Of course, hopelessness is the state that should be described individually. However, there
are some factors that might be quite universal for the majority of the people. For example,
the World Values Survey indicates that more than 62 percent of the total surveyed across
the world are worried about losing their job and more than 87 percent find that work
plays an important role in their lives (Inglehart et al., 2014). Assuming that to an extent
generalisation of preferences is reasonable, we can recall the seminal paper by Hamermesh
and Soss (1974) that presents a model of suicide behaviour. In this paper I slightly modify
the original model to adjust it for the purpose of this study.
First, let us assume that the utility an individual derives at time m is a function of income
Y :
Um = αYm, (3.1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a biological parameter. I plug income into the utility function, as
it allows consumption of more and wider variety of goods that should lead to a higher
utility level. However, by Y we can also consider other things that derive us positive
utility, like family, friends or achievements of the favourite football team, so it should
be rather considered as a vector of variables. However, individuals also incur costs of
maintaining themselves alive at particular age a: K(a). As people become older, the age-
related disutility becomes larger: medical expenditures, physical or emotional pain rise
with age (∂K∂a > 0). Summing it up, the individual’s lifetime utility at a certain age a looks
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the following way3:
Z(a, Y ) =
∫ ω
a
e−r(m−a)UmP (m)dm−K(a), (3.2)
where r is the private discount rate, ω is the highest attainable age and P (m) is the
probability to survive until m. However, individuals do not necessarily kill themselves,
when their lifetime utility is negative. Hamermesh and Soss (1974) assume that individuals
might have some taste for living, b, making them refrain from suicide even when utility
is negative. If we translate b for the whole country, this variable can include such major
factors as religion that typically forbids suicide or social norms (“What will the neighbours
say?”). As a result, we can expect a representative individual to commit suicide when:
Z(a, Y ) + b < 0. (3.3)
Combining Eq.(3.1) and (3.2) we can analyse how different variables affect lifetime utility
and, hence, potential decision of a respective individual to commit suicide. For example,
as income is supposed to increase lifetime utility, we can expect that higher incomes are
associated with less suicide. On the contrast, older populations are expected to be more
prone to suicide, as they have less time to enjoy consumption and higher maintaining costs.
The relationship between the suicide rate and its potential drivers will be tested empirically
in the next section. It is important to note that even though Eq.(3.3) models suicide as a
rational decision. If people are so unhappy why do not we just let them kill themselves?
However, as it was demonstrated above, perception of various life events (in this case,
utility-enhancing) can be distorted by the environment. As a result, from an individual’s
point of view committing suicide can be perfectly rational, but this rationality is based
on a set of determinants, some of which can be changed. Identifying these factors can be
useful for suicide prevention in the future.
3.2 Empirical strategy
The main goal of this paper is to identify some fundamental drivers of suicide that can
affect suicide rates at the country level. Even though many factors are purely individual,
some still might be valid for a large amount of people residing in the country. First of all,
I process the equations of the previous section and extract those potential drivers that can
3The only difference to Hamermesh and Soss (1974) is that I include into lifetime utility only the cost
of maintaining oneself at age a: K(a). In the original paper authors have included costs as a negative
factor directly into utility at every time m (here, in Eq.(3.1)), so that lifetime utility Z included lifetime
maintaining costs, too. I consider my formulation slightly more realistic, as it prevents young individuals
from committing suicide even if they are aware that at some point in life maintaining themselves alive
will be extremely tough.
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be measured at the country level.
To start with, I analyse Eq.(3.1) to determine the factors that might affect utility. Income is
measured with GDP per capita, but I can also analyse how it translates into utility. For this
purpose I take a closer look at α. This biological parameter can be affected in several ways.
First of all, genetics might play a role. Some populations are more vulnerable to particular
genetic diseases (Nakatsuka et al., 2017), like sickle-cell disease (Weatherall and Clegg, 2001;
Asnani et al., 2011) or Tay-Sachs disease (Myerowitz and Costigan, 1988; McDowell et al.,
1992). Given this, we can expect a particular type of 5-HTT polymorphism that distorts
normal serotonin circulation might be more prevalent in some populations. Unfortunately,
I cannot obtain data on prevalence of this particular type of serotonin transporter for
representative samples of countries’ populations. However, I can use some proxy that might
capture the probability of presence of a certain type of 5-HTT polymorphism that increases
the likelihood of committing suicide. For this I employ the ancestry-adjusted predicted
genetic diversity variable from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Ramachandran et al. (2005) have
demonstrated that migratory distance from Eastern Africa can be a good indicator of the
genetic diversity of indigenous populations. To account for more recent migration the
genetic diversity predicted by the distance from Africa is adjusted by applying the World
Migration Matrix by Putterman and Weil (2010). As a result, adding the genetic diversity
variable I attempt to answer the following question: does genetic diversity decrease the
presence of the suicide-promoting form of 5-HTT polymorphism in the national genetic
pool? In other words, if people in the country have a broader genetic pool, the incidence
of a particular gene that determines the certain form of 5-HTT (so that it increases the
probability of committing suicide) can be relatively lower. This hypothesis will be tested
in the regression analysis.
However, as was described in the previous section, besides genetics the α parameter can
be influenced by the insensitivity of UVR in the country. If we take the hypothesis that
serotonin levels are negatively associated with depression and, hence, suicide as valid, we
can expect UVR (that promotes serotonin production) to be suicide-decreasing. If the
serotonin hypothesis is not valid, we cannot neglect beneficial effect of light for depression
alleviation. Regardless of the mechanism, the previous section has shown motivation for the
following hypothesis: higher levels of UVR increase utility through bigger α and decrease
suicide rates. To test this statement I employ the average daily ambient ultraviolet radiation
level data from the World Health Organisation. This variable is adjusted for population
distribution across countries and is measured in Joules per square metre. WHO provides
data only for 2004, however Andersen et al. (2016) have argued in their paper that the
UVR levels at the surface are relatively constant and “current comparative UVR levels are
likely to be an excellent indicator of UVR conditions a few centuries ago”(Andersen et al.,
2016, p.1349). The concerns about the depletion of ozone layer should not cause serious
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bias for my estimations. The point is that there are three types of UVR that reach the
Earth: UVC with wavelengths from 200 to 280 nm, UVB - from 280 to 315 nm, and UVA
- from 315 to 400 nm (Calbo and Gonzalez, 2005). The smaller the wavelength, the deeper
the radiation can penetrate human bodies and more harm it can cause. Fortunately for us,
UVC radiation is completely filtered out by the atmosphere (Calbo and Gonzalez, 2005).
UVB is partially filtered by the ozone layer, while UVA is mostly unaffected by ozone
depletion (Rousseaux et al., 1999). Out of the three types of UVR UVA is particularly
important for my research, as it seems to enhance serotonin production (Gambichler et al.,
2002; Zawilska et al., 2007). The WHO data indicates the amount of energy reaching the
ground and from NASA (2002)4 we know that most of the energy reaching the surface
is coming exactly from UVA radiation. Finally, depression normally takes some time to
develop, especially to the stage that leads to suicide, but the timing might differ across
individuals. Given that, I do not expect fluctuations in values (also lagged ones) of UVR
in a particular year to explain between-year variations in suicide rates. Instead, I aim
to capture the deterministic effect of the general UVR level on suicides. For this reason,
time-invariant measure of solar exposure appears appropriate.
The two variables already described in this section serve as potential determinants of α - the
parameter that regulates the extent to which income and other factors translate to utility in
Eq(3.1). However, from Eq.(3.2) we can expect other factors to be affecting lifetime utility.
First of all, the probability of survival to the age m. If an individual expects to live a short
life, he might value his future utility way lower. Alternatively, this can be thought about
from the psychiatric point of view: a higher probability of dying might raise stress levels and
provoke depression. I proxy P (m) with adult mortality rate (per 100 people). The higher
mortality rate would indicate a lower probability of a respective individual surviving to any
age m. Besides that, mortality also affects the maximum attainable age ω, so it captures
this channel, too. To avoid any potential reverse causality of suicide on adult mortality
and bad control problem, I subtract suicides from the total mortality rate. As a result,
adult mortality employed further in this paper accounts for all causes except suicide. The
final component of the lifetime utility function from Eq.(3.2) is the cost of maintaining
oneself alive. To measure the cost in terms of utility, rather than money, I employ the
variable “years lived with disability” (YLD) provided by WHO. It captures the severity of
the illnesses individuals live with before death, so can serve as an indicator of maintenance
costs. WHO reports this data in absolute terms, so to make the values comparable I scale
them down by the total population in the country (separately for men and women). As
a result I get a per capita YLD variable that indicates how many years of a healthy life
a representative individual loses due to disability. To test how income inequality affects
suicide rates I include it into the regression equation. To measure inequality I use data for
4Last accessed on 08.06.2108
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Gini coefficients from the World Bank5. Speaking about the reservation component b from
Eq.(3.3), I come up with a set of proxies to measure it at the country level. As was already
mentioned in the previous section unemployment rates might be important for prediction of
suicide rates. However, besides lowering effect on expected income or raising stress levels,
unemployment might have the opposite effect. For example, the depressed, but employed
person might refrain from committing suicide if he knows that he has to support his family,
especially at the times when jobs are scarce. Which effect prevails will be tested in the
regression analysis. Finally, religion is a very important factor that might affect the suicide
decisions. I control for it constructing a set of religious dummies. Pew Research Center’s
Forum on Religion & Public Life (2012) provides data for shares of population affiliated
with one of the world’s major religious groups: Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Folk,
Other or not affiliated to any. I assign countries to a particular religion if more than 50
percent of their population are affiliated to this confession. Hence, I split countries into
Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish, Hindu and Unaffiliated. Countries without prevailing
religion (none of the religious groups constitutes 50 percent) are defined as Mixed. The
latter group of countries is excluded from the regressions as a base group.
Finally, I need to explain the dependent variable used for the regression analysis. The WHO
provides several variables measuring suicide rate in the country. First of all, I take values for
males and females separately. This allows to increase precision and analyse if determinants
of suicide are in any way gender-specific. Secondly, it is natural to expect that countries
with larger populations simply experience more suicides, so the rates are calculated as
number of suicides per 100.000 people. Finally, if we expect older people to kill themselves
more often, due to higher maintaining costs and lower remaining lifetime utility, we have
to address this fact. WHO (2014) provides data on suicide rates disaggregated between
age groups. Unfortunately, this data is available only for 2012, but for a large number
of countries. Table 3.1 presents crude suicide rates disaggregated between age cohorts
separately for OECD6 and non-OECD countries. Advantage of using crude suicide rates is
that they can also be considered as simple probabilities of a respective age group to commit
suicide. In Table 3.1 suicide rates generally increase with age for males and females both in
OECD and non-OECD countries, as existing studies predict. Interestingly, children (aged
4-15) and elderly (70+) tend to commit suicide more often in developing countries, while
adults between 30 and 69 kill themselves more often in OECD member-states. Overall,
crude suicide rates for the whole population (i.e., not controlling for age structure) are
significantly higher in developed countries. However, these numbers are misleading. For
example, teenagers and young adults (aged 15-29) on average have similar suicide rates both
5Due to the fact that this data has lots of gaps in the study period, I extend the dataset employing
five-year average values. I assume that inequality is persistent enough and does not vary dramatically
within 5 years. This assumption is supported by the studies of Mookherjee and Ray (2003); Williamson
(2010); Bertola et al. (2010); Covarrubias et al. (2015).
6See the list of OECD countries in Appendix.
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in OECD and non-OECD. In contrast, this age cohort generally has a higher probability of
committing suicide than a respective citizen of their country (regardless of the age - “all” line
in Table 3.1) in non-OECD countries, and smaller one in OECD. This observation points at
the fact that the crude suicide rate of the whole population is likely to be downward biased
in developing (predominantly young) countries. Kids and teenagers (4-15 years) commit
suicide extremely rarely regardless of the OECD status, but constitute a substantial share
of population in developing countries. At the same time, elderly people are generally more
prone to suicide and they are relatively over-represented in developed countries.
Table 3.1: Crude age-specific suicide rates (per 100,000), 2012
OECD countries non-OECD countries
Age cohort Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. ∆
Panel A: Males
4-15 35 0.720 0.753 135 1.341 1.628 -0.621∗∗
15-29 35 14.963 6.447 135 13.578 11.436 1.385
30-49 35 24.934 10.810 135 16.004 15.671 8.931∗∗∗
50-69 35 30.851 16.257 135 20.887 18.934 9.964∗∗∗
70+ 35 39.689 32.771 135 42.061 35.324 -2.372
all 35 21.311 9.766 135 12.098 10.833 9.214∗∗∗
Panel B: Females
4-15 35 0.377 0.409 135 0.947 1.118 -0.570∗∗∗
15-29 35 4.534 3.046 135 5.253 5.183 -0.719
30-49 35 6.766 4.005 135 4.322 4.039 2.443∗∗∗
50-69 35 9.151 5.076 135 7.487 6.545 1.664
70+ 35 9.869 11.401 135 19.914 24.305 -10.046∗∗
all 35 6.337 3.810 135 4.372 3.565 1.965∗∗∗
∆ indicates the difference of means between OECD and non-OECD countries. P-values are
obtained after running a t-test of means. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To enable comparison of countries with different demographic profiles WHO provides age-
standardised rates: a weighting function is applied such that all countries are standardised
to the WHO Standard Population (WHO, 2014). This data is provided for years 2000,
2005, 2010 and 2015 for virtually all countries of the World, so it allows to cover a very
substantial part of the globe. It is important to mention that suicide might be not properly
reported, especially if we consider developing countries, where vital registration systems
are not well-developed and social and religious norms might lead to under-reporting (or
maybe over-reporting) of the actual suicide cases. The WHO evaluates the quality of the
mortality data and assigns each country a value from 1 to 4, where smaller values indicated
higher quality of the data. I include this parameter into regression to check if the countries
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with low-quality of statistics systematically under- or over-report suicides.
For regression analysis I primarily employ OLS estimator. For robustness checks I also
use weighted least squares and fixed effects estimators that will be described in the next
section. The main regression specification can be described by the following equation:
yit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Γit + λt + µr + εit, (3.4)
where yit is the suicide rate in country i at year t, a vector X includes variables of pri-
mary interest for this paper: UVR (the average daily ambient ultraviolet radiation level),
predicted genetic diversity, GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, unemployment and adult mor-
tality rates, YLD and religious shares. The vector Γ includes a set of auxiliary controls:
data quality parameter, latitude, temperature and precipitation. λt is a year fixed effect,
µr is a set of regional dummies (the World Bank regions) and εit is an error term. The
results of the estimations are presented in the next section.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 3.2 demonstrates the results of the estimation of the regression model described
in Eq.(3.4). We see negative correlation between UVR and suicide rates, both for males
and females. However, the relationship gets weaker, if we add additional controls and
even disappears for females in column (6). One possible issue is that the relationship
between suicide rates and UVR might be non-linear in the used dataset. If I run a non-
parametric estimation (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) of the relationship between
suicide rates and UVR, I get clearly non-linear pattern of distribution of fitted values,
as Fig.(3.2) demonstrates. Graphs for both male and female suicide rates remind the U-
shaped relationship between UVR and suicides. We can easily test if this is actually the
case, by adding the squared UVR term into regression described in Eq.(3.4).
Table 3.3 demonstrates that once we allow for a non-linear pattern, the relationship be-
tween UVR and suicides becomes strongly significant and robust to inclusion and exclusion
of additional controls and fixed effects. Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in Appendix demonstrate
that single coefficients are also generally robust to inclusion of other explanatory variables
not included in the list of control variables. The difference in coefficients between genders
should not be misleading: females generally have way lower suicide rates, so the coefficients
partially account for this difference. Moreover, the results of the test of a U-shaped rela-
tionship described by Lind and Mehlum (2010) indicate statistically significant U shape in
all regression specifications. Moreover, the UVRmin values indicating the minimum of the
function appear quite similar for males and females. Besides UVR values, suicide rates are
significantly positively correlated with adult mortality. Higher adult mortality decreases
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Table 3.2: Determinants of suicide. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UV-radiation -3.692∗∗∗ -5.367∗∗∗ -4.690∗∗∗ -0.679∗∗ -1.194∗∗∗ -0.981∗∗
(1.259) (1.636) (1.654) (0.292) (0.380) (0.466)
genetic diversity -40.533 -84.607∗ -71.532 -29.175 -52.705∗∗ -49.783∗
(36.980) (45.870) (46.983) (18.151) (25.077) (25.619)
log(GDP per capita) 0.436 0.365 0.387 0.135 0.063 0.073
(0.959) (1.023) (1.018) (0.251) (0.243) (0.242)
inequality -0.076 -0.208∗ -0.172 -0.016 -0.038 -0.038
(0.100) (0.115) (0.117) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031)
unemployment -0.339∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗ -0.303∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.129) (0.123) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
adult mortality 0.804∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.133) (0.130) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
YLD 7.974 2.587 35.324 30.215 20.650 30.913∗
(92.964) (87.129) (84.614) (19.141) (19.021) (18.638)
data quality -1.751 -2.540∗ -3.026∗∗ 0.107 -0.279 -0.375
(1.271) (1.521) (1.504) (0.327) (0.372) (0.363)
Christian -2.414 -3.177 -4.554 -2.202 -2.097 -2.557∗
(3.909) (3.648) (3.835) (1.831) (1.453) (1.405)
Muslim -3.389 -2.816 -3.464 -1.093 -1.089 -1.312
(4.069) (4.026) (4.096) (1.860) (1.472) (1.449)
Buddhist 10.448 12.775∗ 11.906∗ 2.822 3.265∗ 3.052
(8.251) (6.801) (6.818) (2.379) (1.960) (2.016)
Jewish -0.282 0.795 -0.645 -1.873 -2.319 -2.707
(4.723) (5.699) (5.729) (2.010) (1.849) (1.815)
Hindu -4.919 -7.491 -8.797 0.863 -0.887 -1.288
(4.013) (7.257) (7.472) (2.202) (2.686) (2.689)
unaffiliated -1.758 -2.685 -4.575 -1.107 -1.199 -1.668
(4.383) (4.067) (4.044) (2.221) (2.050) (2.027)
year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
regional FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
geographic controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 420 420 415 420 420 415
Number of countries 142 142 140 142 142 140
Adj. R-squared 0.478 0.499 0.518 0.361 0.405 0.418
Unemployment, adult mortality and YLD stand for male unemployment, adult mortality and YLD in
columns (1)-(3) and female unemployment, adult mortality and YLD in columns (4)-(6). Geographic
controls include: temperature, precipitation and latitude. Standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
evaluated lifetime utility: people expect to yield utility for a shorter timespan, and also
evaluate future utility less, as the probability of living until then is rather low. Religious
dummies have different effects: while predominantly Christian countries typically have less
suicides than with mixed religious profile, male residents of Buddhist countries tend to
commit suicide more often.
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Figure 3.2: Suicide and UVR. Non-parametric estimation
Another interesting result of the regression estimations presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 is
that coefficients for the genetic diversity variable indicate no significant effect on suicide
rate. However, this result does not indicate whether genetics has an effect on suicide, but
rather demonstrates that genetic diversity is not a suitable indicator of suicide-promoting
genetic profile of the respective individual in a country. The incidence of suicide-increasing
5-HTT form might be not dependent on overall genetic diversity of the population and
be simply more prevalent in some countries, as suggested by the medical literature on
the topic. Goldman et al. (2010) present a detailed survey of the studies that analyse
the distribution of 5-HTT polymorphism genotypes across different countries and ethnic
groups. Their results suggest that the incidence of particular forms of the 5-HTT-related
genes rather depends on the race. Given that genetic diversity is not solely determined by
the race (for example, Kazakhstan and the Gambia have similar genetic diversity values and
different racial profiles), the latter can be a more deterministic factor for suicide-related 5-
HTT polymorphism. The countries’ racial composition is partially captured by the regional
effects and will be later fully controlled in the country fixed effects specification.
It is worth noting that Table 3.3 does not demonstrate strongly significant effect of income.
First of all, GDP per capita is correlated with adult mortality. Even though the correla-
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Table 3.3: Determinants of suicide. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UVR -20.459∗∗∗ -26.178∗∗∗ -28.893∗∗∗ -4.584∗∗∗ -5.876∗∗∗ -6.758∗∗∗
(3.607) (4.181) (5.608) (1.043) (1.061) (1.454)
UVR2 2.194∗∗∗ 2.603∗∗∗ 2.908∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗
(0.459) (0.512) (0.648) (0.141) (0.131) (0.178)
genetic diversity -34.598 -38.513 -26.253 -29.460∗ -44.007∗ -40.312∗
(33.147) (45.181) (41.608) (17.518) (24.836) (23.594)
log(GDP per capita) -0.139 -0.792 -0.953 0.015 -0.190 -0.236
(0.943) (1.061) (1.131) (0.249) (0.253) (0.280)
inequality 0.094 -0.010 -0.021 0.019 0.004 -0.003
(0.096) (0.112) (0.117) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031)
unemployment -0.254∗∗ -0.167 -0.227∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.031 -0.045∗∗
(0.113) (0.125) (0.122) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
adult mortality 0.720∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.130) (0.130) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
YLD -31.134 -75.226 -70.494 28.029 13.520 14.697
(83.252) (82.702) (90.981) (18.808) (18.953) (19.186)
data quality -1.832 -3.120∗∗ -3.267∗∗ 0.131 -0.393 -0.425
(1.150) (1.380) (1.261) (0.305) (0.350) (0.323)
Christian -4.674 -4.747 -7.159∗∗ -2.760 -2.519∗ -3.231∗∗
(3.861) (3.178) (3.533) (1.779) (1.354) (1.392)
Muslim -3.750 -2.865 -3.989 -1.262 -1.144 -1.491
(3.891) (3.500) (3.591) (1.799) (1.361) (1.397)
Buddhist 11.477 11.333∗∗ 10.987∗ 2.940 2.814 2.665
(7.627) (5.525) (5.617) (2.255) (1.822) (1.884)
Jewish 1.457 0.663 -0.144 -1.253 -1.933 -2.249
(4.512) (4.742) (4.737) (2.008) (1.655) (1.684)
Hindu -2.653 -6.493 -7.856 1.313 -0.726 -1.135
(3.885) (6.127) (6.131) (2.248) (2.461) (2.527)
unaffiliated -4.771 -6.108 -7.511∗ -1.831 -2.041 -2.447
(4.493) (3.695) (4.216) (2.347) (2.033) (2.221)
UVRmin 4.662 5.028 4.968 4.457 4.999 4.854
U-test p-value 0.004 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.022 0.020
year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
regional FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
geographic controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 420 420 415 420 420 415
Number of countries 142 142 140 142 142 140
Adj. R-squared 0.534 0.560 0.578 0.402 0.448 0.466
Unemployment, adult mortality and YLD stand for male unemployment, adult mortality and YLD in
columns (1)-(3) and female unemployment, adult mortality and YLD in columns (4)-(6). Geographic
controls include: temperature, precipitation and latitude. Standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
tion coefficient of -0.68 for males and -0.71 for females is above the threshold value of -0.8
indicating multicollinearity, as Gujarati (2003) suggests. Nevertheless, Tables A3.1 and
A3.2 in Appendix demonstrate that coefficients for per capita GDP lose significance after
including adult mortality into the regression. However, this highlights potential transmis-
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sion channel: people might feel stressed not because they are just poor, but rather because
they are more likely to die due to being poor. Furthermore, aggregate values of income
might be not a very good predictor of suicide rate in the country, as we do not know who
exactly commits suicide. As was mentioned above, financial hardship might be a stress
factor that increases the number of suicides. At the same time, poverty might be a limiting
factor, as the breadwinner might feel obliged to stay alive and support his family. Another
issue in this context is matching incomes with suicide cases: mean income does not allow
us to distinguish if suicides are committed over-proportionately by rich or poor. Finally,
income inequality coefficients demonstrate no significant effect on suicide rates. Moreover,
Table A3.3 demonstrates similar non-significant outcomes, once I control for non-linear
relationship of inequality in income (e.g., do status concerns cause more stress in poor or
rich countries?).
Surprisingly, unemployment coefficients presented so far demonstrate negative or not sig-
nificant effects on suicide rates. There might be several explanations for this result. First
of all, besides satisfaction work can provoke long-term stress and thus contribute to higher
suicide rates. Secondly, when jobs are scarce, people might try to keep their jobs (also by
staying alive) to support their families. To explore the relationship between suicide and
unemployment, Table 3.4 demonstrates the regression results with different combinations of
unemployment measures. Columns (1) and (4) include 5 year lags of unemployment rates
to control for long-term effects of unemployment-induced stress for males and females,
respectively. The general level of unemployment is proxied by 5-year average levels of un-
employment rates in columns (2) and (5). The effect of the other gender’s unemployment
rates is evaluated in columns (3) and (6). The results presented in Table 3.4 rather indicate
again that if there is an effect, unemployment might be suicide-decreasing. Results for the
other gender unemployment rates support the hypothesis that unemployment can act as
a reservation factor: when more males (females) have hard times finding the job, females
(males) from the same households might feel obliged to stay alive to support the family.
However, these results should be treated with caution, as the effect of unemployment on
suicide rate can be better analysed at the micro level.
Finally, a very important finding is the significance of the data quality coefficient in some
specifications considered so far. Negative effect indicates that countries with bad data
quality typically report lower number of suicides. One possible explanation is that countries
with low quality of vital registration statistics share some characteristics, besides the ones
controlled for in the regression analysis so far, which prevent individuals from committing
suicide. However, it can also be the sign of under-reporting of suicides, for example, due
to religious and cultural norms.
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Table 3.4: Suicide and unemployment. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UVR -27.968∗∗∗ -29.016∗∗∗ -28.425∗∗∗ -6.747∗∗∗ -6.783∗∗∗ -6.916∗∗∗
(5.632) (5.615) (5.699) (1.461) (1.450) (1.442)
UVR2 2.824∗∗∗ 2.927∗∗∗ 2.865∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
(0.648) (0.650) (0.657) (0.178) (0.177) (0.176)
genetic diversity -24.532 -27.190 -20.381 -41.571∗ -40.399∗ -41.885∗
(41.406) (41.936) (42.154) (23.775) (23.402) (23.629)
log(GDP per capita) -0.763 -1.026 -0.779 -0.246 -0.249 -0.282
(1.146) (1.135) (1.150) (0.284) (0.278) (0.279)
inequality -0.049 -0.031 -0.033 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.119) (0.120) (0.116) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
male unemployment -0.238 -0.048
(0.371) (0.030)
female unemployment -0.181∗∗ 0.050
(0.087) (0.076)
unemployment(t−1) -0.106 -0.173
(0.625) (0.111)
unemployment(t−2) 0.295 0.136
(0.542) (0.107)
unemployment(t−3) -1.089 -0.068
(0.713) (0.105)
unemployment(t−4) 1.295∗ -0.024
(0.777) (0.100)
unemployment(t−5) -0.319 0.035
(0.319) (0.055)
5-year unemployment -0.184 -0.044∗
(0.133) (0.023)
adult mortality 0.739∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.132) (0.132) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
YLD -76.540 -72.606 -77.736 13.144 14.506 14.860
(91.999) (91.870) (91.060) (19.295) (19.194) (19.125)
data quality -3.169∗∗ -3.317∗∗∗ -3.286∗∗ -0.427 -0.430 -0.425
(1.264) (1.263) (1.266) (0.327) (0.323) (0.325)
UVRmin 4.952 4.956 4.961 4.884 4.856 4.853
U-test p-value 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.024 0.020 0.017
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
religious dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 415 415 415 415 415 415
Number of countries 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adj. R-squared 0.581 0.575 0.578 0.462 0.466 0.464
5-year unemployment stands for 5-year average male unemployment in column (2) and 5-year average
female unemployment in column (5). Lagged unemployment values stand for lagged male unemployment
in column (1) and lagged female unemployment in column (4). Adult mortality and YLD stand for male
adult mortality and YLD in columns (1)-(3) and female adult mortality and YLD in columns (4)-(6).
Geographic controls include: temperature, precipitation and latitude. Standard errors clustered at the
country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.3.1 Explaining the U-shape
The relationship between the UVR and suicides presented on Fig.(3.2) appears quite puz-
zling in spite of the presented biological mechanism. The downward slope of the curve
to the left from 4.5 kJ/m2 point perfectly fits into the described logic: higher levels of
exposure to solar radiation increase serotonin circulation lowering the number of suicides.
However, the upward slope of the curve after the minimum point cannot be explained by
this mechanism. I found no evidence suggesting that excessive exposure to solar radia-
tion might harm serotonin turnover or provoke suicide directly through other biological
channels. However, we can also analyse the indirect channels: for example, the negative
effect of excessive solar exposure on general health might serve as a stress factor or induce
hopelessness (Andersen et al., 2016). To test this line of argument I evaluate the effect
of sun-related diseases on suicide. WHO claims that excessive UVR can cause a range of
diseases, while skin cancer and eye diseases are the most prevalent between them (Lucas
et al., 2006). I suppose that the prevalence of sun-caused diseases might raise stress levels
or cause the state of hopelessness and, hence, raise the suicide rates. WHO provides data
for the number of disability-adjusted life years (DALY) for sun-related diseases. It allows
me to capture both incidence and severity of diseases and test if they really contribute to
higher suicide rates.
Another factor to consider in this context is the adaptability of individuals to the envi-
ronment. To help people cope with solar radiation, over generations skin pigmentation
has been changing to adjust for the amount of ambient UVR (Lucas et al., 2006). Lighter
skin allows to absorb as much solar energy as possible in UVR-scarce regions, while in
UVR-intensive areas an increased amount of melanin in the skin protect cells from ex-
cessive amounts of solar radiation. In other words, evolution has adjusted skin types to
optimise absorption of solar radiation. However, once the discovery of the New World has
triggered mass migration, many individuals were relocated to the places, where ambient
solar radiation does not fit their skin colour. To check if this has an effect on suicide rates
nowadays, I construct the difference between the actual UVR exposure and the ancestry
adjusted one. To do so, I employ the World Migration Matrix by Putterman and Weil
(2010) and calculate ancestry-weighted UVR exposure variable. This number tells me to
how much solar radiation an average individual in the country would have been exposed
to, absent the post-1500 migration. The difference between this calculated number and the
actual UVR exposure might tell how much more or less UVR a respective individual gets
in his country given his ancestry.
However, the results presented in Table 3.5 suggest that both sun-related diseases and the
difference between actual and historical UVR levels do not have a significant effect on male
suicide rates. Similar insignificant results are observed for females. This finding suggests
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Table 3.5: Suicide and sun-related diseases. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UVR -28.881∗∗∗ -29.028∗∗∗ -28.854∗∗∗ -28.811∗∗∗
(5.642) (5.730) (5.610) (5.642)
UVR2 2.906∗∗∗ 2.924∗∗∗ 2.904∗∗∗ 2.878∗∗∗
(0.651) (0.663) (0.648) (0.660)
genetic diversity -26.150 -26.816 -25.705 -34.733
(41.610) (41.681) (41.674) (42.404)
log(GDP per capita) -0.952 -0.970 -0.953 -1.071
(1.132) (1.131) (1.133) (1.117)
inequality -0.020 -0.027 -0.019 -0.038
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.121)
unemployment -0.228∗ -0.224∗ -0.228∗ -0.227∗
(0.122) (0.123) (0.121) (0.121)
adult mortality 0.735∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.129)
data quality -3.266∗∗ -3.265∗∗ -3.262∗∗ -3.082∗∗
(1.262) (1.259) (1.259) (1.329)
YLD -70.206 -72.942 -69.259 -68.397
(91.386) (92.586) (90.814) (90.780)
UVR DALYs -0.000
(0.006)
skin cancer 0.006
(0.017)
cataract -0.002
(0.008)
UV difference -2.602
(2.885)
UVRmin 4.969 4.963 4.967 5.005
U-test p-value 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.012
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
religious dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 415 415 415 415
Number of countries 140 140 140 140
Adj. R-squared 0.577 0.577 0.577 0.578
Unemployment, adult mortality, YLD and UVR DALYs indicate data for males. Ge-
ographic ontrols include: temperature, precipitation and latitude. Standard errors
clustered at the country level are in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
77
3 Burnt by the Sun
Note: Horizontal red lines mark 25th parallels north and south.
Figure 3.3: Average levels of UVR exposure
that environmental factors that might increase suicide rates even through indirect biological
channels do not seem to play significant role. Hence, there must be other factors driving
the suicide rates upwards as we move above the 4.5 kJ/m2 point. To better understand
what those factors might be, we first need to identify what countries are exposed to UVR
levels around 4.5 kJ/m2 and above.
First of all, I check if results are robust to the splitting of the sample between OECD
and non-OECD countries. At the same time it allows to check if the effects of UVR and
adult mortality established so far hold in both groups of countries. For OECD countries
I cannot include regional dummies, as majority of the countries lie in Europe and Central
Asia (23 out of 28 included into the regression) and their inclusion distorts the regression
results. To ensure comparability, Column (2) of Table 3.6 provides results of a regression
without regional dummies for non-OECD countries. Coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 3.6 do not differ substantially from the results obtained so far for the whole sample
of countries. Moreover, the minimum point also lies within the same range, so the results
are robust to the exclusion of OECD countries. Speaking about OECD countries, only
1 country (Mexico) is exposed to UVR levels above the level of 4 kJ/m2. This explains
insignificant UVR coefficients in Column (3): there are simply no countries that can reverse
the negative effect of UVR. As a result, linear specification in Column (4) appears more
justified.
Table 3.6 demonstrates that U-shape relationship between UVR and suicide is not driven by
the presence of OECD countries in the full sample. However, there might be other country
characteristics that provide this pattern besides the level of economic development. Figure
3.3 demonstrates that the threshold line after which an increase in UVR is associated with
higher suicide rates lies approximately 25 degrees of latitude north and south from the
equator. Countries within this belt can share other common features that can bias the
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Table 3.6: Determinants of suicide in non-OECD and OECD countries. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sample of countries: non-OECD OECD
UVR -41.121∗∗∗ -45.974∗∗∗ -2.001 -9.861∗∗
(5.660) (6.608) (6.996) (4.165)
UVR2 4.479∗∗∗ 4.835∗∗∗ -1.617
(0.654) (0.753) (1.133)
genetic diversity -5.437 -49.185 -368.445∗∗∗ -304.235∗∗
(37.328) (46.197) (121.664) (114.460)
log(GDP per capita) 0.532 0.675 0.496 1.126
(1.221) (1.264) (3.078) (3.583)
inequality 0.116 -0.022 -0.207 -0.158
(0.102) (0.108) (0.358) (0.372)
unemployment -0.414∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.094 0.020
(0.118) (0.118) (0.153) (0.166)
adult mortality 0.581∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.122) (0.282) (0.280)
YLD -99.028 -199.531∗∗ 60.499 216.610∗
(84.064) (90.183) (190.438) (122.013)
data quality -1.354 -2.651∗∗ 5.033 5.521
(1.186) (1.123) (3.195) (3.438)
Christian -3.129 -4.611 -11.876∗∗∗ -17.297∗∗∗
(2.274) (3.338) (3.959) (2.992)
Muslim -0.903 -2.644 -9.021∗ -13.738∗∗∗
(2.277) (3.509) (5.008) (4.871)
Buddhist 14.564∗∗ 13.287∗∗
(6.793) (5.240)
Jewish 3.679 -1.680
(2.824) (4.293)
Hindu 0.838 -7.109
(3.313) (6.155)
unaffiliated -6.583∗∗ -8.867∗∗ -11.273∗∗∗ -16.157∗∗∗
(2.832) (3.825) (3.554) (2.158)
UVRmin 4.590 4.754 -0.619
U-test p-value 0.000 0.000 TR
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
regional FE No Yes No No
geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 328 328 87 87
Number of countries 112 112 28 28
Adj. R-squared 0.619 0.662 0.800 0.793
“TR” stands for trivial rejection of a U-shape hypothesis, as the extreme point lies
outside the interval of UVR values in the sample. Unemployment, adult mortality and
YLD indicate data for males. Geographic controls include: temperature, precipitation
and latitude. Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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regression results. Given that the 25th parallel south mostly passes through the oceans, I
expect the reversal of the effect of UVR on suicides to be mostly driven by the countries
on the 25th parallel north. Moreover, if we take a closer look at the map of Figure 3.1, we
see that countries on the 25th parallel north generally have relatively low suicide rates, on
the contrast to those lying further to the south. Once I have identified the geographical
region that can bias the regression estimates, I can attempt to determine why are countries
there special in terms of suicide rates. Solar radiation in the countries within this belt is
definitely quite high: a person with skin type I (fair skinned Caucasian) needs only 200
J/m2 to gain a perceptible sunburn (Lucas et al., 2006). What if people residing south of
this region, hence, closer to the equator avoid sun and just stay indoors? UVR variable
indicates only the characteristic of the environment that individuals face, but does not say
how they actually react to it. As a proxy for the amount of time individuals actually stay
under the sun, I use the share of population employed in agriculture. Contrast to factory
workers or office clerks, people working in the fields have to stay outdoors, at least, part of
their time, when the sun is already out. This measure is not perfect, as farmers in sunny
regions may refrain from working in the hours of peak solar activity. However, exposure
in relatively less intensive periods still allows the body to gain, at least, some amount of
UVR. Once I interact UVR with the share of population employed in agriculture, I capture
both quality (UVR intensity) and quantity (time people stay outdoors) aspects of exposure
to solar radiation. However, as columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.7 demonstrate, controlling
for actual exposure is not enough to explain the U-shaped relationship between UVR an
suicide, so there must be other factors determining this pattern.
Besides similar geographic conditions, we can also notice that the majority of the coun-
tries are predominantly Muslim and belong to the Arab World, so I can assume some
degree of cultural proximity. Out of Middle-Eastern and North-African (MENA) countries
the World Values Survey (2014) provides data for Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Qatar and Yemen. On average 89% of sur-
veyed individuals in these countries have attributed religion as being very important in
their lives, while in the rest of the surveyed world this share is only 43.3% (Inglehart et al.,
2014). Similar pattern is observed in the results of Gallup Poll in 2009: 89% of surveyed
citizens of the Middle-Eastern countries has replied yes to the question “Is religion im-
portant in your daily life?”, while in the rest of the world only 71% has replied the same
way7 (Crabtree, 2010). In other words, the data suggest that not only religion, but espe-
cially the degree of religiosity, can be a serious reservation factor that prevents people from
committing suicide in the MENA region. To control for the degree of religiosity in the
covered sample of countries, I use the share of population that considers religion important
in their daily life from the Gallup Poll 2009, as it has a much wider coverage, compared
to the World Values Survey. I assume that religiosity across countries has not changed
7 Difference between the MENA countries and the rest of the world is statistically significant at 1%-level.
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dramatically between 2000 and 2015 and values of 2009 can be used for its measurement.
However, columns (2) and (5) of Table 3.7 demonstrate no significant degree of religiosity
on suicide rates. The reason might be different attitudes towards suicide between religions.
Even though, all religions included in the analysis in one way or another discourage sui-
cide, some might be less strict in this regard. To control for different effect of religiosity
between confessions, I interact religious dummies used so far with the share of people that
consider religion important in their daily life. Hence, I obtain not only nominal affiliation
to a particular confession, but also some evaluation of how important religious norms are
for people. This approach yields the insignificant U-shape relationship between UVR and
suicides, as columns (3) and (6) of Table 3.7 show. As a result, I can argue that there is
no increase in the number of suicides due to the excessive solar radiation south from the
25 degrees of latitude line, but this effect is rather driven by the presence of the MENA
countries in the sample: moderately sunny, predominantly Muslim and relatively more re-
ligious states that report low suicide rates. Finally, the coefficient of a squared UVR term
is still significant even though the hypothesis of the U-shape relationship can be rejected.
This can be perfectly explained by non-linear (but still monotonously decreasing) effect of
UVR on suicide rates. As exposure to solar radiation increases, the marginal effect of UVR
decreases. In other words, we can expect some degree of saturation with UVR: in areas
closer to the equator the sun is so intensive, that individuals residing in these areas can
hardly avoid solar radiation in quantities sufficient for proper functioning of the body.
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Table 3.7: Religiosity and suicide. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UVR -28.156∗∗∗ -24.248∗∗∗ -22.052∗∗∗ -6.124∗∗∗ -6.046∗∗∗ -5.826∗∗∗
(5.532) (5.443) (5.617) (1.445) (1.484) (1.614)
agriculture -0.084 -0.064 -0.135 -0.045 -0.050 -0.063∗
(0.174) (0.189) (0.180) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036)
UVR × agriculture -0.006 -0.010 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.012
(0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
UVR2 2.878∗∗∗ 2.517∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.677) (0.639) (0.645) (0.187) (0.187) (0.202)
genetic diversity -28.127 -45.416 -48.407 -40.328∗ -43.533∗ -44.155∗
(40.705) (43.166) (42.860) (23.881) (25.422) (25.400)
log(GDP p.c.) -2.394 -2.657 -2.504 -0.421 -0.672∗ -0.657∗
(1.609) (1.927) (1.625) (0.334) (0.374) (0.384)
inequality -0.031 0.012 -0.024 -0.001 0.009 0.010
(0.120) (0.138) (0.132) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
unemployment -0.272∗∗ -0.249∗ -0.301∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.043∗ -0.044∗∗
(0.126) (0.128) (0.120) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
adult mortality 0.731∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.134) (0.159) (0.144) (0.040) (0.038) (0.037)
YLD -48.277 -43.583 33.424 11.102 13.522 21.484
(91.640) (92.564) (81.432) (19.945) (21.823) (21.769)
data quality -2.848∗∗ -3.204∗∗∗ -1.485 -0.389 -0.562∗ -0.339
(1.237) (1.118) (0.907) (0.327) (0.309) (0.305)
Continued on the next page
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Table 3.7: – continued from the previous page
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
religiosity -0.080 -0.121 -0.021 -0.000
(0.059) (0.109) (0.016) (0.050)
Christian -6.829∗ -7.699 -11.475 -3.260∗∗ -4.041∗∗ -2.895
(3.476) (4.795) (10.637) (1.400) (1.739) (5.134)
C. × religiosity 0.114 -0.013
(0.120) (0.055)
Muslim -4.080 -4.977 -2.583 -1.412 -2.282 0.620
(3.583) (4.841) (14.428) (1.394) (1.753) (5.263)
M. × religiosity 0.050 -0.034
(0.162) (0.059)
Buddhist 12.172∗∗ 15.276∗∗ -2123.825∗∗∗ 2.804 3.817 -206.867
(5.656) (6.842) (286.434) (1.889) (2.319) (139.928)
B. × religiosity 21.986∗∗∗ 2.154
(2.914) (1.435)
Jewish 0.587 -3.986 3.414 -2.285 -4.158∗∗ -3.196
(4.698) (5.460) (4.771) (1.673) (1.848) (2.323)
Hindu -7.510 -8.180 254.198∗∗∗ -0.946 0.935 194.432∗∗∗
(6.154) (8.388) (75.337) (2.456) (3.068) (19.367)
H. × religiosity -2.670∗∗∗ -2.092∗∗∗
(0.833) (0.212)
unaffiliated -7.850∗ -10.007∗ -13.020 -2.590 -5.127∗∗ -10.993
(4.239) (5.660) (18.897) (2.271) (2.185) (7.253)
U. × religiosity 0.111 0.351
(0.864) (0.331)
UVRmin 4.891 4.817 5.379 5.172 4.848 5.107
U-test p-value 0.016 0.020 0.148 0.126 0.064 0.140
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 415 383 383 415 383 383
N of countries 140 126 126 140 126 126
Adj. R-squared 0.583 0.579 0.632 0.467 0.485 0.497
Employment in agriculture, unemployment, adult mortality and YLD stand for male employment
in agriculture, unemployment, adult mortality and YLD in columns (1)-(3) and female employment
in agriculture, unemployment, adult mortality and YLD in columns (4)-(6). Geographic controls
include: temperature, precipitation and latitude. Standard errors clustered at the country level are
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.3.2 Robustness check - Fixed Effects estimation
The results demonstrated above support the hypothesis that higher levels of UV radiation decrease
the number of suicides, while potential stress factors, as higher adult mortality increase it. Shares
of population attributed to particular confessions can act as reservation factors preventing suicides,
especially in Protestant and Muslim countries. However, once I point out that religion might play an
important role, I need to consider other aspects of culture. Moreover, variations between countries
in cultural and religious norms even within one confession can be crucial in determining the “culture
of suicide”. For this reason I need to control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. To
do so, I employ the country fixed effects (FE) estimator. Raw version of UVR variable provided by
WHO does not vary over time, hence, is not suitable for this purpose. However, the approach used
in the previous section, allows to make exposure to solar radiation a dynamic variable, due to the
fact that actual UVR exposure varies over time, as people shift their activities in- or outdoors over
time. Having a time-varying measure of exposure to solar radiation, I can perform a fixed effects
estimation, results of which are presented in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Determinants of suicide. Country FE estimates.
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UVR × agriculture -0.128∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.014∗∗
(0.047) (0.048) (0.007) (0.007)
agriculture 0.593∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.056 0.070∗∗
(0.230) (0.238) (0.037) (0.035)
log(GDP per capita) -2.469∗ -0.669∗
(1.353) (0.385)
unemployment 0.027 0.063 0.001 0.013
(0.058) (0.057) (0.011) (0.011)
adult mortality 0.300∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (0.012) (0.013)
YLD -157.406∗∗∗ -153.681∗∗∗ -35.848∗∗ -34.433∗∗
(52.081) (53.906) (15.548) (15.471)
country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 662 680 662 680
Number of countries 167 170 167 170
Adj. R-squared 0.309 0.299 0.189 0.180
Unemployment, adult mortality and YLD stand for male unemployment, adult mor-
tality and YLD in columns (1) and (2) and female unemployment, adult mortality
and YLD in columns (3) and (4). Agriculture denotes share of male working popula-
tion employed in agriculture in columns (1) and (2) and female working population in
columns (3) and (4). Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.8 demonstrates that controlling for unobserved factors that constitute potential “culture of
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suicide”, we still observe significant negative effect of solar exposure on suicide rates. This effect
is smaller for females, but this can be explained by the fact that women generally commit suicide
way less and their suicide rates are harder to predict compared to males. Moreover, the interaction
of UVR and agricultural employment variables might be not equally informative for males and
females, if it is meant to control for the “efficient” exposure to solar radiation. As was mentioned
above, agricultural workers are assumed to spend more time outdoors, hence, to be more exposed
to UVR. However, the actual “absorption” of solar radiation can also be affected by some cultural
factors. Table 3.9 demonstrates that among the countries, included in the regression sample, share
of women employed in agriculture is significantly higher in Muslim countries compared to the
non-Muslim. This reveals an interesting fact: female employment in agriculture is higher in the
countries, where women traditionally wear less open clothes, thus limiting the potential degree
of exposure to UVR. In other words, employment in agriculture might be a worse predictor of
actual exposure to solar radiation for females than for males. Interestingly, for males there is no
significant difference between predominantly Muslim states and the rest of the World. Nevertheless,
this should have no effect on actual UVR exposure for men, as they are typically not constrained
in their way of clothing.
Table 3.9: Share of population employed in agriculture (%)
Muslim countries Rest of the World
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. ∆
Females 176 39.530 29.174 504 28.332 30.059 11.197∗∗∗
Males 176 33.588 24.688 504 30.972 24.932 2.616
∆ indicates the difference of means between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. P-
values are obtained after running a t-test of means. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
It is important to note that inclusion of per-capita GDP together with shares of employment in
agriculture into the regression presented in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.8 raises multicollinearity
problem, but coefficients of interest remain robust nevertheless, as columns (2) and (4) demonstrate.
Even though, the negative coefficient of income on suicide rates fits to the theoretical predictions of
the paper, this finding should be considered cautiously, as inequality issue is completely ignored in
this case. Gini coefficients are excluded from the regressions to keep the sample close-to-balanced.
Moreover, as was noted above, income inequality is quite persistent, especially within 15 years,
and, hence, should be controlled for by inclusion of country fixed effects. Finally, we still observe
significant effect of adult mortality on suicide rates, but controlling for time-invariant country
characteristics makes the years lived with disability coefficient significant. Unlike the theoretical
prediction, where YLD is included to control for costs of maintaining oneself alive, the empirical
result has a negative coefficient on suicide rates. There might be several explanations to this
finding. On one hand, severely ill individuals can refrain from suicide as they expect to die due to
natural causes in the nearest future. On the other hand, higher number of ill people in the country
might indicate a larger demand for care from their relatives, what can serve as a reservation factor.
Regardless of the exact channel, the magnitude of the effect is quantitatively small: one standard
deviation in YLD is associated with less than 0.1 standard deviation in suicide both for males and
females.
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3.3.3 What does it all mean?
Previous sections of the paper have demonstrated that differences in suicide rates across countries
can be driven by two fundamentally different groups of factors. The main determinants of suicide
identified in this paper are UVR and adult mortality - two factors that differ in nature. While UVR
is purely environmental characteristic, adult mortality is to a large extent economically or socially
determined. For the purpose of this paper I categorise suicides into environmentally-driven (lack
of UVR) and socially-driven (high stress levels due to high adult mortality) suicides. Given this
difference in the nature of factors, we can analyse what countries are more vulnerable to a particular
group of drivers. Table 3.10 presents summary statistics of UVR variables, adult mortality and
suicide rates in OECD member-states (developed countries) and non-OECD states (developing
countries).
Table 3.10: Summary statistics of selected variables in OECD and non-OECD states
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: OECD countries
male suicide rate 87 17.526 7.477 5.1 39.3
female suicide rate 87 5.224 2.614 1.1 18.4
UVR 87 2.166 0.789 1.439 4.974
UVR2 87 5.308 4.821 2.071 24.741
adult mortality (male) 87 11.641 4.278 6.2 25.7
adult mortality (female) 87 5.915 1.678 3.3 10.8
Panel B: non-OECD countries
male suicide rate 328 18.799 12.690 0.4 70.3
female suicide rate 328 5.645 3.318 0.1 19.2
UVR 328 4.240 1.251 1.671 6.089
UVR2 328 19.534 9.610 2.792 37.076
adult mortality (male) 328 26.165 11.131 7 65.2
adult mortality (female) 328 18.110 11.748 3.8 63.1
Strikingly, unlike crude suicide rates presented in Table 3.1 age-standardised suicide rates both for
males and females are quite similar across OECD and non-OECD countries. However, we see that
UVR exposure and adult mortality are significantly higher in developing countries8. Majority of
developed countries lie in less sunny areas, where lack of solar radiation can provoke depression
and, consequently, pull suicide rates upwards. On the contrast, better living conditions, reflected
by lower mortality rates, can reduce stress levels and, hence, suicide rates. As a result, I can claim
that in developed countries suicides are rather driven by environmental characteristics, namely
UVR levels. However, in developing countries the two groups of factors act completely different:
more solar radiation should prevent suicides (and this claim is supported by a set of biological
studies presented above), but higher adult mortality contributes to an increase in number of self-
8T-test of means indicates that the following differences between non-OECD and OECD countries: 2.074
for UVR, 14.524 for male adult mortality, 12.195 for female adult mortality, are statistically significant
at 1%-level.
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killings. This claim can be supported by comparing the contribution of the two variables to the
explanation of the suicide rates. I do this by comparing the partial R-squared of UVR-related
variables and adult mortality rates in Table 3.11. To calculate the share of variation of suicide
rates, which is explained only by a single variable of interest (UVR or adult mortality), I first run
the regression (similar to the ones presented in column 1 and 4 of Table 3.3) including the whole
set of controls, except for the variable of interest, separately for OECD and non-OECD countries.
Afterwards, I extract the residuals, obtaining only that part of variation in suicide rates that is
not correlated with other controls. Then I repeat the exercise having the variable of interest as
the dependent variable - to obtain the part of variation in the variable of interest not correlated
with other regressors. Finally, I regress the predicted residuals of the suicide rates on the predicted
residuals of a UVR or adult mortality. The R-squared of this regression tells us how much of the
variation in suicide rates is explained by each of the variables of interest, once the effect of all other
variables has already been controlled for.
Table 3.11: Partial R2 of selected variables
males females
OECD non-OECD OECD non-OECD
adult mortality rate 0.195 0.228 0.286 0.087
UVR 0.413 0.031 0.340 0.011
Note: Regressions of UVR in non-OECD sample do not include the squared
term. Inclusion of the squared term of predicted residuals yields the partial
R-squared of 0.031 for males and 0.012 for females.
As can be seen from Table 3.11, adult mortality rates explain comparable parts of variation in
suicide rates both in OECD and non-OECD countries. On the contrast, while UVR can explain
more than one third of variation in developed countries, it works as a very bad predictor of suicide
rates in developing countries. This implies a striking difference in the nature of the major driving
forces of suicides across OECD and non-OECD member-states. The empirical results suggest
that we should expect more environmentally-driven suicides in developed countries and more of
socially-driven in developing ones. Moreover, estimations suggest that improving mortality rate in
developing countries up to the average level of OECD member-states can decrease the number of
suicides roughly by half for males and by one third for females.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper has analysed cross-country variations in suicide rates to identify fundamental factors
that can influence the number of people killing themselves given a set of country characteristics.
As was pointed above, suicide still remains personal and often sporadic decision. Hence, not all
factors can be identified at the macro level. This paper has demonstrated that the effects of
genetics, income or unemployment are hard to detect at the country-level, as we do not know
how the distribution of these variables relates to the distribution of suicides. Nevertheless, this
paper has identified a set of fundamental factors that can form a physical environment or some
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cultural features that, in turn, affect suicide rates. Ultra-violet radiation and adult mortality
are the examples of the factors that can be studied at the cross-country level. Solar radiation
affects many biological processes in our body, including functioning of the brain. Lack of UVR
can distort circulation of serotonin and cause depression, which in extreme cases leads to suicide.
If a country lies in areas with less solar radiation, we can expect its residents, ceteris paribus,
to be more vulnerable to suicide. Unlike income or employment, exposure to solar radiation has
unambiguous effect on suicides and can be assumed to be distributed way more evenly across citizens
of the country allowing some degree of generalisation. Another factor that appears appropriate
for macro-level analysis is adult mortality. As was demonstrated in the theoretical section of the
paper this variable affects utility of individuals through several channels, but all of them are better
captured at the macro level. If one individual dies at young age, it does not necessarily set a prior
for his compatriots that they die young, too. However, when many people manage to live only
until a certain age, it might determine the perception of maximum attainable age and probability
of attaining it for the citizens of a country. Those individuals who do not expect to live much
longer can develop hopelessness (another component of depression syndrome) that increases their
likelihood of committing suicide.
Another important finding of this paper is that even though similar factors affect suicide rates both
in developed and developing countries, the quantitative effects of different factors vary substantially.
Developed countries mostly lie in relatively darker areas (suicide increasing), but have low adult
mortality rates (suicide decreasing). On the contrary, most of the developing countries (e.g., in Sub-
Saharan Africa) are exposed to large amounts of solar radiation, but also have high adult mortality.
As a result, we see no significant difference in suicide rates (after controlling for age structure of
the population) between developed and developing countries, but similar suicide rates result from
entirely different combinations of causes. Results of the regression estimations presented in this
paper should not be treated as ultimate drivers of suicide or used for predictions, but rather used
to motivate future studies on the topic. The findings of the paper point out at the differences in
nature of major factors affecting suicide decisions across countries at different stages of economic
development. Hence, results of existing studies of suicide conducted at the micro level in developed
countries are not necessarily applicable in the developing World, implying that more attention
should be devoted to the problems of suicide in developing countries.
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Appendix
List of OECD countries
OECD countries are defined according to the membership status in the beginning ot the sampled
period (2000) and therefore include the following 30 countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
and United States.
List of non-OECD countries
Non-OECD countries include countries that were not members of the organisation until 2000:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.),
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, the Gambia, Georgia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Is-
rael, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mau-
ritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turk-
menistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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Summary statistics and sources of used variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
age-standardised male suicide rate 415 18.532 11.793 0.4 70.3 World Bank
age-standardised female suicide rate 415 5.556 3.185 0.1 19.2 World Bank
UVR 415 3.805 1.442 1.439 6.089 WHO
UVR2 415 16.552 10.554 2.071 37.076 WHO, AC
male adult mortality net of suicides 415 23.120 11.692 6.2 65.2 World Bank, AC
female adult mortality net of suicides 415 15.553 11.589 3.3 63.1 World Bank, AC
genetic diversity 415 0.725 0.029 0.628 0.774 Ashraf and Galor (2013)
log(GDP per capita, PPP) 415 8.893 1.220 6.098 11.554 World Bank, AC
inequality (Gini coefficient, 5-year average) 415 39.602 9.014 21.1 65.8 World Bank, AC
male unemployment rate 415 7.785 5.594 0.405 34.903 World Bank
female unemployment rate 415 9.640 7.329 0.215 59.165 World Bank
years lost due to disability (male) 415 0.090 0.009 0.064 0.119 WHO
years lost due to disability (female) 415 0.101 0.012 0.077 0.131 WHO
data quality 415 2.289 1.298 1 4 WHO
Christian dummy 415 0.660 0.474 0 1 Pew Research Center(2012)
Muslim dummy 415 0.212 0.409 0 1 Pew Research Center(2012)
Buddhist dummy 415 0.048 0.214 0 1 Pew Research Center(2012)
Jewish dummy 415 0.010 0.098 0 1 Pew Research Center(2012)
Hindu dummy 415 0.014 0.120 0 1 Pew Research Center(2012)
Unaffiliated dummy 415 0.024 0.154 0 1 Pew Research Center(2012)
latitude 415 21.603 25.588 -34 64 Ashraf and Galor (2013)
temperature 415 16.975 8.671 -7.929 28.639 Ashraf and Galor (2013)
precipitation 415 90.069 57.806 2.911 259.952 Ashraf and Galor (2013)
share of labour in agriculture (male) 415 31.908 24.007 0.8 88.3 World Bank
share of labour in agriculture (female) 415 31.374 29.584 0.1 96.8 World Bank
religious importance 383 72.133 24.688 16 99 (Crabtree, 2010)
AC stands for author’s calculations. All incurred mistakes are therefore mine.
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Table A3.1: Determinants of male suicide. OLS estimates.
suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UVR -18.036∗∗∗ -20.243∗∗∗ -20.846∗∗∗ -25.587∗∗∗ -25.358∗∗∗ -23.247∗∗∗ -16.639∗∗∗ -16.197∗∗∗ -20.459∗∗∗
(3.829) (4.175) (4.107) (4.305) (4.240) (4.193) (3.273) (3.507) (3.607)
UVR2 2.244∗∗∗ 2.554∗∗∗ 2.454∗∗∗ 2.805∗∗∗ 2.708∗∗∗ 2.478∗∗∗ 1.655∗∗∗ 1.633∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.531) (0.525) (0.521) (0.507) (0.485) (0.403) (0.403) (0.459)
genetic diversity 11.291 -3.740 -12.518 4.285 -16.798 -69.400∗∗ -64.826∗∗ -34.598
(26.228) (27.185) (29.432) (28.607) (27.753) (29.352) (30.561) (33.147)
log(GDP per capita) -2.493∗∗∗ -3.623∗∗∗ -3.600∗∗∗ -3.730∗∗∗ 1.350 0.971 -0.139
(0.657) (1.062) (1.048) (1.021) (0.913) (0.967) (0.943)
inequality 0.329∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.036 0.094
(0.109) (0.115) (0.112) (0.120) (0.125) (0.096)
unemployment -0.262∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗
(0.143) (0.137) (0.097) (0.095) (0.113)
YLD 189.454∗ -59.118 -44.966 -31.134
(98.608) (89.960) (106.631) (83.252)
adult mortality 0.801∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
data quality -0.699 -1.832
(1.248) (1.150)
Christian -4.674
(3.861)
Muslim -3.750
(3.891)
Buddhist 11.477
(7.627)
Jewish 1.457
(4.512)
Hindu -2.653
(3.885)
unaffiliated -4.771
(4.493)
N 696 636 619 420 420 420 420 420 420
Number of countries 174 159 156 142 142 142 142 142 142
Adj. R-squared 0.119 0.135 0.181 0.225 0.235 0.248 0.467 0.468 0.534
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0191
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Table A3.2: Determinants of female suicide. OLS estimates.
female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UVR -2.896∗∗∗ -3.340∗∗∗ -3.461∗∗∗ -4.037∗∗∗ -3.526∗∗∗ -2.876∗∗ -2.131∗ -2.573∗∗ -4.584∗∗∗
(0.909) (1.073) (1.068) (1.207) (1.230) (1.215) (1.102) (1.080) (1.043)
UVR2 0.401∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.223 0.256∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.146) (0.147) (0.158) (0.162) (0.157) (0.148) (0.142) (0.141)
genetic diversity -5.527 -11.190 -13.649 -7.139 -14.610 -34.840∗∗ -36.876∗∗ -29.460∗
(12.902) (13.178) (14.961) (15.499) (15.530) (15.880) (15.846) (17.518)
log(GDP per capita) -0.878∗∗∗ -0.861∗∗∗ -0.789∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ 0.049 0.258 0.015
(0.216) (0.285) (0.284) (0.271) (0.251) (0.248) (0.249)
inequality 0.005 0.023 0.008 -0.063∗∗ -0.046 0.019
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.024)
unemployment -0.066∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
YLD 57.142∗∗ 12.226 11.060 28.029
(24.594) (23.500) (21.884) (18.808)
adult mortality 0.182∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
data quality 0.607∗∗ 0.131
(0.304) (0.305)
Christian -2.760
(1.779)
Muslim -1.262
(1.799)
Buddhist 2.940
(2.255)
Jewish -1.253
(2.008)
Hindu 1.313
(2.248)
unaffiliated -1.831
(2.347)
N 696 636 619 420 420 420 420 420 420
Number of countries 174 159 156 142 142 142 142 142 142
Adj. R-squared 0.029 0.039 0.103 0.094 0.111 0.135 0.252 0.270 0.402
Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3.3: Suicide and inequality. OLS estimates.
male suicide rate female suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UVR -27.780∗∗∗ -28.024∗∗∗ -5.336∗∗∗ -4.937∗∗∗
(7.011) (7.450) (1.925) (1.841)
UVR2 2.750∗∗∗ 2.778∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗ 0.485∗∗
(0.857) (0.890) (0.257) (0.243)
genetic diversity -55.037 -54.780 -51.258∗∗ -51.897∗∗
(47.812) (47.894) (24.828) (24.783)
log(GDP per capita) -1.104 -1.775 -0.230 0.797
(1.201) (4.328) (0.287) (0.895)
inequality -0.214 -0.359 -0.044 0.191
(0.164) (0.832) (0.044) (0.194)
log(GDP) × inequality 0.018 -0.028
(0.103) (0.024)
unemployment -0.034 -0.042 -0.040 -0.032
(0.169) (0.171) (0.032) (0.033)
adult mortality 0.739∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.130) (0.039) (0.040)
YLD -133.569 -130.314 41.664∗∗ 40.057∗
(123.090) (120.387) (20.088) (20.416)
data quality -3.714∗∗ -3.679∗∗ -0.205 -0.261
(1.468) (1.479) (0.330) (0.325)
Christian -5.242∗ -5.205∗ -1.566∗ -1.613∗
(3.050) (3.075) (0.809) (0.819)
Muslim -2.834 -2.866 -0.319 -0.268
(3.119) (3.141) (0.875) (0.867)
Buddhist 11.660∗∗ 11.650∗∗ 4.690∗∗∗ 4.735∗∗∗
(4.863) (4.883) (1.172) (1.174)
Jewish -2.341 -2.379 -1.428 -1.268
(4.737) (4.760) (1.192) (1.175)
Hindu -6.436 -6.380 0.540 0.425
(5.942) (6.013) (2.458) (2.510)
unaffiliated -4.880 -4.823 -0.076 -0.170
(4.147) (4.107) (1.926) (1.940)
UVRmin 5.051 5.044 5.024 5.087
U-test p-value 0.067 0.064 0.189 0.212
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 325 325 325 325
Number of countries 129 129 129 129
Adj. R-squared 0.537 0.536 0.457 0.459
Unemployment, adult mortality and YLD stand for male unemployment, adult mor-
tality and YLD in Columns (1) and (2) and female unemployment, adult mortality
and YLD in Columns (3) and (4). Geographic controls include: temperature, precipi-
tation and latitude. Standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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